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I. ABSTRACT
In 1996, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Markman that claim construction 
was a matter of law for the judge to decide.1 There was hope in the patent bar that 
Markman would bring uniformity to claim construction and a reduction to the 
lengthy process of patent litigation.2 Some authors report instead that the claim 
construction reversal rate is increasing.3 Other authors question the consistency of 
                                                          
1 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996). 
2 Id. at 390. 
3 For example, reversal rates from 1983 to 2000 averaged 22%. Professor Moore's "detailed study 
of patent cases … found that … the CAFC reversed 22% in some form." Andrew T. Zidel, Patent 
Claim Construction in the Trial Courts: A Study Showing the Need For Clear Guidance from the 
Federal Circuit, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 711, 739 (2003) (citing (then Professor, now Circuit Judge) 
Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases - an Empirical Peek Inside the Black Box, 99 
MICH. L. REV. 365, 367-68 (2000)). Then, from 1996 to 2003, reversal rates averaged 34.5%. ("The 
reversal rate … from 1996 … through 2003 is 34.5%." Kimberly A. Moore, Markman Eight Years 
Later: Is Claim Construction More Predictable?, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 231, 233 (2005)). For 
2001, reversal rates averaged 41.5%. (In 2001, "41.5%, of the cases having Markman Hearings had 
their claim construction reversed on appeal." Andrew T. Zidel, Patent Claim Construction in the Trial 
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the rulings from the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.4 Circuit Judge Rader 
of the Federal Circuit recently named this controversy the “Evolving Written 
Description Doctrine.”5
Behind this controversy primarily lies judicial interpretation of the patent 
statute, 35 U.S.C. § 112, with other statutes invoked periodically to support or 
counter differing opinions.6 These opinions suggest that the Court of Appeals for 
the Federal Circuit is invoking the judicial doctrine of possession to modify what 
the statutory requirements of enablement, best mode and definiteness.7 A patentee 
writing a broad embodiment may suffer invalidity for failing to satisfy the 
definiteness requirement. Conversely, an application with distinctly expressed 
embodiments may suffer from element exclusion and forfeit an otherwise 
acceptably broad embodiment.8
This article reviews the back-to-back cases of JVW Enterprises, Inc. v. 
Interact Accessories, Inc.,9 and LizardTech, Inc. v. Earth Resource Mapping, Inc.10
The subsequent en banc denial in LizardTech evoked a declaration by Circuit 
Judge Rader that the Federal Circuit has created an “Evolving Written Description 
Doctrine,” in part over the court’s invocation of the possession test.11 Together 
with a discussion of the patent law and the judicial doctrines behind it, this article 
seeks to show that the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is misapplying 
judicial doctrine (notably, the possession test) and lowering the standard for when 
this judicial doctrine applies. 
Section I provides an overview of patent law and judicial doctrines that are 
                                                          
Courts: A Study Showing the Need For Clear Guidance from the Federal Circuit, 33 SETON HALL L.
REV. 711, 741 (2003)). Irrespective of minor statistical differences, these articles state that judges 
facing claim construction rulings in patent cases have a chance of being overturned ranging from one-
quarter to almost half. Thus, patent judges face a reversal rate several times higher than other areas of 
law. (The reversal rate in all circuits for all appeals (criminal and civil) from April 1, 2002 to March 31, 
2003 was 9.4%. Federal Judicial Caseload Statistic, Table B-5, Appeals Terminated on the Merits, by 
Circuit, During the 12-Month Period Ending March 31, 2003, available at: http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
caseload2003/tables/B05Mar03.pdf (last visited October 14, 2007). However, different authors count 
reversal statistics somewhat differently. Some authors do not count a reversal if the reversal was based 
on Rule 36. "All of the other early claim construction studies (the Chu Study (44% reversal rate), the 
Bender Study (40% reversal rate), and the Zidel Study (41.5% reversal rate)) omitted Rule 36 cases 
from their claim construction reversal rate determinations." Kimberly A. Moore, "Markman Eight Years 
Later: Is Claim Construction More Predictable?" 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 231, 235-236 (2005) 
(citations omitted)). 
4 Michael A. O'Shea, A Changing Role For The Markman Hearing: In Light Of Festo Ix, Markman 
Hearings Could Become M-F-G Hearings Which Are Longer, More Complex And Ripe For Appeal, 37 
CREIGHTON L. REV. 843, 2004. 
5 LizardTech, Inc. v. Earth Res. Mapping, Inc., 433 F.3d 1373, 1381, (Fed. Cir. 2006) (Circuit 
Judge Rader dissenting). 
6 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1) et. seq. 
7 An early invocation of possession as relating to 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1) was Application of Smith, 
481 F.2d 910 (C.C.P.A., 1973). ("[An] important purpose of § 112, first paragraph … is the definition 
of the attributes which a patent specification must possess as of the filing date to be entitled to that 
filing date as a prima facie date of invention.") Id. at 914 (emphasis added). 
8 DeAnn Foran Smith, Evolving Issues In The Written Description Requirement, in PREPARING 
PATENT LEGAL OPINIONS 2006, (2006). 
9 JVW Enters., Inc. v. Interact Accessories, Inc., 424 F.3d 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
10 LizardTech v. Earth Resource Mapping, 424 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
11 Id. at 1378. 
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applicable to the written description and claim construction. Section II discusses 
the factual and legal issues of the JVW and LizardTech cases. Section III discusses 
Circuit Judge Rader’s rationale for the “Evolving Written Description Doctrine” 
and the role the judicial doctrine of possession has to the “Evolving Written 
Description Doctrine.” Section IV concludes with commentary from the viewpoint 
of a practitioner examining the roles that Congress and the Federal Circuit have in 
promulgating the statutory requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112 and the interpretative 
judicial doctrines. 
II. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
A. Introduction and Role of the Written Description 
1. The Statutory Basis for a Written Description 
A patent application is a written document crafted to meet the legal 
requirements of a specification and drawings for an invention.12 The United States 
Patent and Trademark Office (“Patent Office”) reviews patent applications 
according to Patent Law under 35 U.S.C. § 1, et. seq., the Patent Rules, 37 C.F.R. 
§ 1, et. seq., and the Manual for Patent Examining Procedures, a detailed guide 
written for examiners by the Patent Office.13 A drawing is often helpful to describe 
an invention, but pictures can show only so much. Thus, patent law requires that 
the specification describe the invention in writing, rather than by pictures alone.14
The patent rules also require drawings that show every feature of the invention 
specified in the claims.15 Only on rare occasions is a drawing sufficient to support 
an otherwise imprecise patent application.16
2. Describing the Invention 
“A patentee has the right to be his own lexicographer.”17 This phrase dates 
                                                          
12 35 U.S.C. § 111(a) (2006). 
13 "The patent law is Title 35 of the United States Code which governs all cases in the U.S. P.T.O." 
Introduction, Manual of Patent Examining Procedures (Patent and Trademark Office (8th ed. rev 6 
2007)). The U.S. P.T.O. may "establish regulations … for the conduct of proceedings in the U.S. 
P.T.O." 35 U.S.C. § 2. "[I]n the Code of Federal Regulations the rules pertaining to patents are in Parts 
1, 3, 4, 5, and 10 of Title 37." Id. "This Manual is published to provide … patent examiners, applicants, 
attorneys, agents, and representatives of applicants with a reference work on the practices and 
procedures relative to the prosecution of patent applications before the USPTO." Forward, Manual of 
Patent Examining Procedures (8th ed. rev. 6 2007). 
14 37 C.F.R. § 1.153(a) (2000). 
15 37 C.F.R. § 1.83(a) (2000). 
16 Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (reversing invalidity for 
reliance on drawing and remanded to determine the sufficiency of the drawing to §112.). See also,
Lance Leonard Barry, A Picture is Worth a Thousand Words: Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar, 76 J. OF PAT.
& TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 5 (1994). 
17 Esnault-Pelterie v. United States, 81 Ct.Cl. 785, * (1935) *Publication page references are not 
available for this document. The United States Court of Claims preceded the Court of Customs and 
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back several decades as a judicial doctrine allowing a patentee to use words of the 
patentee’s own choosing to describe the invention in the specification, even if the 
meaning contradicts the ordinary meaning.18 Even so, patent practice is not as 
flexible. The patent rules require the specification to include a brief and detailed 
written description with drawings. 19 Patent law requires the specification conclude 
with the claims.20 Furthermore, the specification must describe the invention “in 
such full, clear, concise, and exact terms, to enable any person skilled in the art . . . 
to make and use [the invention,] . . . and shall set forth the best mode.21 These 
clauses describe the definiteness requirement, the enablement requirement and the 
best mode requirement, respectively. Together they serve as notice to the public of 
the claimed invention.22 Additionally, these clauses as a whole must meet the 
adequacy requirement of the specification.23
The Person Having Ordinary Skill In The Art, often abbreviated by the 
letters, PHOSITA, is someone with practical experience in the field of the 
invention. In some fields, such a person might have practical on-the-job training, 
while other fields may require many years of academic and technical training.24
Lastly, the claims must “particularly point . . . out and distinctly claim . . . the 
subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.”25
3. Preventing “New Matter” From Being Claimed 
The patent laws and rules also include several express requirements 
regarding prosecution. For instance, a patentee can rely on information in prior 
inventions and filed documents for the enablement requirement.26 A patentee may 
also rely on “incorporation by reference” for information of previously filed 
applications.27 The “no new matter” requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 132 limits 
incorporation by reference to documents known before the initial filing.28 As such, 
the last sentence of 35 U.S.C. § 132 expressly restricts this requirement to 
                                                          
Patent Appeals in hearing patent appeals, with appellate division of the former and the latter court now 
merged into the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. For a brief history of patent law and the 
courts, see www.ladas.com/Patents/USPatentHistory.html and www.federalcircuithistoricalsociety.org/ 
historyofcourt.html. 
18 Hormone Research Found., Inc. v. Genentech, Inc. 904 F.2d 1558, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 
19 37 C.F.R. § 1.77 (2005). 
20 35 U.S.C. § 112 para. 2 (2006). 
21 35 U.S.C. § 112 para. 1 (2006). 
22 All Dental Prodx, LLC v. Advantage Dental Prods., Inc. 309 F.3d 774, 779-780 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
23 Pandrol USA, LP v. Airboss Ry. Prods, Inc., 424 F.3d 1161, 1165 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing 35 
U.S.C. § 112 para. 1 (1994)). 
24 Kistler Instrumente AG v. United States, 1979 WL 16488, at 15 (Ct.Cl. Trial Div. 1979). 
25 35 U.S.C. § 112, para. 2 (2006). 
26 The specification includes a section called "Background of the Invention" for discussing prior 
inventions, which are called "prior art." 37 C.F.R. § 1.77. A patent application does not have to educate 
the person having ordinary skill in the art since such a person is presumed to have "all relevant prior art 
before him." See Donaldson Co., Inc. v. Pneumafil Corp., 617 F. Supp. 1428, 1433 (D.C.N.C. 1985), 
aff’d and vacated in part as moot, 824 F.2d 979 (Fed. Cir. 1987). 
27 37 C.F.R. § 1.57 (2004). 
28 35 U.S.C. § 132(a) (2006). 
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amendments, i.e., documents filed during prosecution.29 The no new matter 
requirement also applies to documents filed before or with the application where 
the application relies on a patent application that did not issue until after the filing 
date, and were therefore unknown to a person skilled in the art at the time of 
filing.30
B. Introduction to the Claim 
1. A Brief History of Claims 
Patent law instruction, like most modern legal instruction programs, omits 
historical considerations as such information is usually not legally significant. In 
the context of patent doctrine, a brief history of the patent claim helps explain the 
policy behind the doctrine. 
The . . . Patent Act of 1793 did not require claims, but did require, in its 3d section, 
that the patent applicant “deliver a written description of his invention, and of the 
manner of using, or process of compounding, the same, in such full, clear and exact 
terms, as to distinguish the same from all things before known, and to enable any 
person skilled in the art or science of which it is a branch, or with which it is most 
nearly connected, to make, compound and use the same. . .” [The] view of this 
language [was] that the specification of a patent had two objects. [F]irst . . . “to 
enable artizans to make and use [the invention]False [and] second . . . to put the 
public in possession of what the party claims as his own invention” [It] guard[s] 
against prejudice or injury from the use of an invention which the party may 
otherwise innocently suppose not to be patented. It is, therefore, for the purpose of 
warning an innocent . . . person using a machine, of his infringement of the patent; 
and at the same time, of taking from the inventor the means of . . . pretending that 
his invention is more than what it really is. [That is] . . . the patentee is required to 
distinguish his invention in his specification.31
In fact, “[c]laim practice did not achieve statutory recognition until the 
passage of the Act of July 4, 1836, and inclusion of a claim did not become a 
statutory requirement until 1870.”32 As the discussion below shows, even while 
discussing the meaning of the claims, the basis of much of the subsequent case law 
focused on the discussion of the invention rather than the claims. Thus, the next 
one hundred years did not bring about many seminal claim related cases. One 
outfall of this focus on the written description is that at least one influential patent 
law text shows about one-third of all seminal patent cases date from after 1970, 
and particularly since 1996.33
                                                          
29 Id.
30 In re Glass, 492 F.2d 1228, 1232 (C.C.P.A. 1974) (disallowing certain patent applications filed 
before the patent at issue, on grounds that the patents did not issue until after the filing date, and were 
therefore not known to a person skilled in the art at the time of filing). 
31 Vas-Cath Inc., 935 F.2d at 1560-61 (citing Evans v. Eaton, 20 U.S. 356, 430-433 (1822)). 
32 Markman, 517 U.S. at 379 (citations omitted). 
33 The reader is directed to the highlighted cases in the Table of Cases (pp. xxvii-xliii) of CRAIG
ALAN NARD ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW, (2d ed. 2001). 
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2. Markman: Claim Construction as a Matter of Law 
One of the difficulties in a patent case is deciding what the inventor 
considered as the invention at the time of filing the application. The judicial 
process of determining the meaning of the claims is “claim construction.” The 
technology is at times difficult for the lawyers to understand and even more so for 
the court. Juries struggled for years with claim construction until the U.S. Supreme 
Court held in Markman that claim construction was a question of law rather than a 
factual question for the jury.34 Decided now by the court as a matter of law, the 
judicial process of claim construction is a Markman hearing. The importance of the 
Markman case is both its question of law ruling and its rationale. The Court stated 
in Markman that claim construction, as a matter of law, is important for uniformity 
in patent cases.35
The Court’s premise was that, “treating interpretive issues as purely legal will 
promote . . . intrajurisdictional certainty through the application of stare decisis on 
those questions not yet subject to interjurisdictional uniformity under the authority 
of the single appeals court.”36
As the Court noted, this was the same rationale used by Congress for 
creating the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.37 To this goal, the Court’s 
rationale was to ensure a proposed definition fully comports with the specification 
and claims, and avoids leaving evidentiary questions of meaning wide open in 
every new court in which a patent might be litigated.38
3. The Fine Art of Claim Construction 
Claim construction must begin with the words of the claims themselves.39
The court will first view the claims in the ordinary and customary meaning of a 
person having skill in the art at the time of invention.40 Complicating claim 
construction is that the format of the claims usually prevents an explanation in the 
claims of their meaning. This format often requires reliance on the written 
description.41 Both claim construction and the adequacy requirement focus on the 
skill of an ordinary person in the art to understand the written description.42 Thus, 
claim construction depends on the field of art and the context of the patent.43
                                                          
34 Markman, 517 U.S. at 391. 
35 Id. at 390. 
36 Id. at 391. 
37 Id. at 390. 
38 Id. at 390-91.
39 Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 457 F.3d 1293, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
40 Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
41 Id.
42 Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
43 Medrad, Inc. v. MRI Devices Corp., 401 F.3d 1313, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
8 BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP & THE LAW Vol. I:1 
4. Role of the Specification to Claim Construction 
While claim construction is a question of law,44 patent “compliance with the 
written description requirement is a question of fact”45 that “depends on what is 
claimed and what is described.”46 To have valid claims to different forms of the 
invention, the patentee must expressly claim the invention with terms that provide 
the broadest interpretation of invention. This makes claim construction more art 
than science as the court often must infer what the patentee attempts to define as 
the invention. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has clearly stated that 
each claim construction case is particular to the patent at issue rather than to 
judicial decisions on claim construction as a whole.47 Thus, the Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit cautions against reading too much into claim construction 
from one patent to another.48
If the specification is not clear enough, other sources are available. On the 
intrinsic side, the court may use the prosecution history, if any.49 If the claims are 
still ambiguous the court may then use dictionaries and extrinsic evidence such as 
treatises, and finally, expert testimony.50 Expert testimony might be used to show 
equivalence at the time of invention, or the time of the alleged infringement.51 The 
basic rule being whether a person having skill in the art of amusement rides would 
know of the equivalence of the claimed and accused inventions.52
C. Patent Claims at Modern Law 
1. Enablement 
a. The Statutory Role 
As an express component of the patent statutes, enablement was not, by that 
term, a hotly debated issue until recently. During the first one hundred years of 
patent law after claims became a statutory requirement, courts created the 
lexicographer doctrine53 and the prohibition against undue experimentation, which 
led to the non-obviousness doctrine, which became a statutory requirement in 
                                                          
44 Markman, 517 U.S. at 391. 
45 Pandrol USA, LP v. Airboss Ry. Products, Inc., 424 F.3d 1161, 1164 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
46 LizardTech, 433 F.3d at 1375. 
47 Cybor Corp. v. FAS Technologies, Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1662 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (Plager, J., 
concurring). 
48 Medrad, 401 F.3d at 1318. 
49 Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582. 
50 Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc, 457 F.3d 1293, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (quoting 
Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys., Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 1116 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). 
51 Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608, 70 S.Ct. 854 (1950); 
Warner-Jenkinson v. Hilton-Davis, 520 U.S. 17, 29, 40, 117 S.Ct. 1040 (1997). 
52 Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 339 U.S. 605, 609, 70 S.Ct. 854 (1950). 
53 Esnault-Pelterie v. United States, 81 Ct.Cl. 785 (1935). 
2007 THE “EVOLVING WRITTEN DESCRIPTION DOCTRINE” 9 
1952.54 Interestingly, these two judicial doctrines laid the foundation for the 
present-day controversy.55
Even without judicial interpretation, the enablement requirement seems plain 
enough. 
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the 
manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact 
terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it 
is most nearly connected, to make and use the same.56
As the applicable role of the judiciary is statutory interpretation, the patent bar 
looks to the courts for useful clarification.57 In fact, the leading case on enablement 
stated enablement as a simple requirement. “The specification contains a written 
description of the invention[,] which must be clear and complete enough to enable 
those of ordinary skill in the art to make and use it.”58
b. The Judicial Role 
The history of the expressions, “full, clear, concise, and exact terms,” and “to 
enable any person skilled in the art” shows that the written description requirement 
of 35 U.S.C. § 112 has not been an easy interpretation.59 For example, “any person 
skilled in the art” in the statute becomes “those of ordinary skill in the art” in 
judicial doctrine.60 Furthermore, “to enable any person skilled in the art” means 
“without requiring undue experimentation.”61 In the most succinct of explanations 
available, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit summarized the requirement 
by saying, “the first paragraph requires that the specification describe the invention 
set forth in the claims.”62
2. Definiteness 
Despite the focus on the written description, in infringement litigation, “the 
name of the game is the claim.”63 While paragraph one of 35 U.S.C. § 112 requires 
“full, clear, concise, and exact terms of the specification as a whole,” the second 
paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112 requires that the claim shall “particularly point[] out 
                                                          
54 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2006). 
55 A careful delineation of case law reveals that the lexicographer doctrine led to the Markman
holding, with the undue experimentation prohibition leading to non-obviousness test and the possession 
test.
56 35 U.S.C. § 112 para. 1 (2006). 
57 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803). 
58 Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582. 
59 35 U.S.C § 112 (2006). 
60 Id.; see also Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582. 
61 Invitrogen Corp. v. Clontech Laboratories, Inc., 429 F.3d 1052, 1070 (Fed. Cir. 2005); 35 U.S.C. 
§ 112 (2006). 
62 Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
63 In re Hiniker Co., 150 F.3d 1362, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (Clevenger, J., quoting Judge Giles 
Sutherland Rich, Extent of Protection and Interpretation of Claims--American Perspectives, 21 INT'L
REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 497, 499 (1990)). 
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and distinctly claim[] the subject matter which the applicant regards as his 
invention.”64 Thus, the claims are what determine the scope of the patent, not the 
rest of the specification. 
Unfortunately, the Patent Office requires that a claim shall be only a single 
sentence describing the invention.65 Consequently, a claim is often a long run-on 
sentence that is contrary to the proper rules of grammar and makes claim 
interpretation much like reading an engineering technical manual.66 Providentially, 
each patent is limited to describing a single invention, and each claim is limited to 
describing a single embodiment of the invention.67
3. Best Mode 
The best mode requirement looks at three factors. First, the specification 
must disclose the most useful form of the invention.68 Second, the knowledge and 
belief of the inventor must be the basis for this form.69 The third factor looks at the 
first two factors as of the filing date.70
4. The Judicial Doctrine of Possession 
a. Supporting the Written Description 
Possession is not a statutory requirement, but a judicial doctrine.71 As noted 
above, an early patent case described possession from the viewpoint of the public. 
“[A] patent had two objects, . . . first. . . ‘to enable artisans to make and use [the 
                                                          
64 An important distinction is that the statutory basis for the claims is 35 U.S.C. § 112(2) (2006). 
65 Manual of Patent Examining Procedures § 608.01(m) (8th ed. rev 6 2007). 
66 Fressola v. Manbeck, 1995 WL 656874 (D.D.C., 1995) (Challenging Manual of Patent 
Examining Procedures § 608.01(m) on grounds that the "one-sentence requirement bears no reasonable 
relationship to the language of and policies behind 35 U.S.C. § 112." Id. at 1. Denied on grounds, "the 
one-sentence rule fits much more comfortably into the "procedural" box than the "substantive" one." Id.
at 4.) 
67 Manual of Patent Examining Procedures §806.03 (8th ed. rev 3 2006). 
68 Great N. Corp. v. Henry Molded Prods., Inc., 94 F.3d 1569 (Fed. Cir. l996) (holding that the 
inventor cannot disclose one embodiment of the invention and refrain from disclosing the best mode for 
commercialization). 
69 Glaxo Inc. v. Novopharm Ltd., 52 F.3d 1043, 1049-52 (Fed.Cir. l995) (holding that the 
knowledge of the assignee is not imputed to the inventor). 
70 W. L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (holding that 
the best mode requirement applies to the inventor's knowledge as of the filing date). See also Transco 
Products Inc. v. Performance Contracting, Inc., 38 F.3d 551, 556-559 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (holding the 
relevant date for evaluating a best mode disclosure in continuation practice is the date of the parent 
application and citing Dow Chemical Co. v. American Cyanamid Co., 615 F.Supp. 471, 482, 229 
U.S.P.Q. 171, 179 (E.D. La. 1985), aff'd, 816 F.2d 617 (Fed. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 849 
(1987) (holding the appropriate date for determining compliance with the best mode requirement for a 
reissue application is the filing date of the original application and not that of the reissue application)). 
71 "The courts have described the essential question to be addressed in a description requirement 
issue in a variety of ways." Manual of Patent Examining Procedures §2163.02 (8th ed. rev 5 2006). 
"[T]o satisfy the written description requirement, an applicant must convey with reasonable clarity to 
those skilled in the art that, as of the filing date sought, he or she was in possession of the invention, and 
that the invention, in that context, is whatever is now claimed." Id. (citing Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar, 
935 F.2d 1555, 1563-64, 19 USPQ2d 1111, 1117 (Fed. Cir. 1991)). 
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invention]’False [and] second . . . ‘to put the public in possession of what the party 
claims as his own invention.’”72
Then, in 1991, possession took on another meaning. In Vas-Cath, the Court 
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit tried to argue a dichotomy in the court over the 
roles of enablement and the written description with this statement. “[T]he 
applicant must . . . convey with reasonable clarity to those skilled in the art that, as 
of the filing date sought, he or she was in possession of the invention.”73
In doing so, the court seemingly created a new doctrine that required, as of 
the filing date, the applicant (i.e., the application) used “reasonable clarity,” to 
inform the person having ordinary “skill in the art,” of the invention.74 The 
problem here is that the enablement requirement requires that the written 
description is clear and complete enough to enable those of ordinary skill in the art 
to make and use it.75 By including the phrases, “with reasonable clarity,” and 
“skilled in the art” with the word possession, the Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit created a new doctrine (test) of possession without answering the question 
of how enablement relates to the written description.76 Focused still on the 
confusion over enablement and the written description, the court sought to clarify 
the matter. “There appears to be some confusion in our decisions concerning the 
extent to which the ‘written description’ requirement is separate and distinct from 
the enablement requirement. The purpose of the written description requirement of 
section 112, first paragraph is to state what is needed to fulfill the enablement 
criteria.”77 While perceiving the confusion as between enablement and the written 
description, the court added a new doctrine of possession for supporting the written 
description requirement. 
With uncertainty still reigning several years later, the court again attempted 
to make a distinction. “[T]here is no question that . . . written description and 
enablement are separate statutory requirements, and that written description is not 
simply a facet of enablement.”78 Not only did the court not clarify the requirements 
of written description and enablement, the court again failed to define what it 
meant by possession.  Fortunately, a review of applicable case law shows that there 
are three facets to possession. These are the filing date, the scope of enablement, 
and predictably of the art. 
b. The Filing Date 
Patent applications often rely on earlier applications to take advantage of the 
earlier filing date to pre-date prior art.79 Such instances also occur in division or 
                                                          
72 Vas-Cath, 935 F.2d at 1560-61 (citing Evans, 20 U.S. at 430-33 (1822)). 
73 Id. at 1563-64 (emphasis added). 
74 Id.
75 35 U.S.C. § 112 para. 1 (2006). 
76 Vas-Cath, 935 F.2d at 1563-64. 
77 Vas-Cath, 935 F.2d at 1563 (emphasis added). 
78 Moba, B.V. v. Diamond Automation, Inc., 325 F.3d 1306, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (Bryson, J., 
concurring). 
79 Application of John P. Glass, 492 F.2d 1228, 1233 (C.C.P.A. 1974) (possession applied to 
growth of crystals seeking earlier filed patent applications as enabling art). Tronzo v. Biomet, Inc., 156 
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continuation practice,80 interference practice81 or in ex parte challenges where the 
patentee added the claim at issue subsequent to the application.82 Such practice is 
also common in the filing of provisional applications and in applications seeking 
the benefit of foreign filed applications in what is called a ‘right of priority.’83 As 
such, the first facet of possession looks to whether at the filing date of an earlier 
document, the earlier document adequately instructs persons ordinarily skilled in 
the art to understand the later claimed invention in the later filed application.84
c. Scope of Enablement 
The scope of enablement facet of possession is likely what contributed to the 
confusion with the enablement requirement. The scope of enablement delineates 
whether what the inventor later claims as invented (i.e., in litigation) is a defined 
embodiment of the disclosure, claims and prosecution history.85 By scope of 
enablement, possession means a claim may not be vague or read as broader than 
the supporting disclosure.86
In Enzo Biochem, the court looked at whether the written description on the 
activity levels of the claimed nucleotides supported the claimed bacteria detection 
inventions.87 While the written description reported in an activity level of greater 
than five, some of the claims had much higher activity levels, and other claims 
referred to the inventions Enzo Biochem had deposited with a public 
organization.88 In a case of first impression, the court stated that “the mere 
appearance of vague claim language in an original claim or as part of the 
specification [does not] necessarily satisf[y] the written description requirement or 
show[] possession of a generic invention.”89 At least for the then new field of 
                                                          
F.3d 1154, 1158 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (possession applied to surgical technique seeking earlier filing date of 
the parent application). 
80 Division practice refers to the splitting of one application containing two or more inventions into 
multiple applications. 35 U.S.C. § 121 (2006). Continuation practice refers to the filing of an 
application to supplant an earlier application. 37 C.F.R. § 1.114 (2007). 
81 Bilstad v. Wakalopulos, 386 F.3d 1116, 1123 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citing Eiselstein v. Frank, 52 F.3d 
1035, 1039 (Fed. Cir. 1995)). 
82 Enzo Biochem. Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 969 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (Lourie, J, 
concurring). 
83 35 U.S.C. §§ 119, 120 (2006). 
84 Application of Edwards, 568 F.2d 1349, 1351 (C.C.P.A. 1978) (Reversing a rejection for 
inadequacy on grounds that an earlier application relied on as a reference did not provide an adequate 
descriptive for the make and use requirement of 25 U.S.C. § 112 para. 1). Said another way: "[T]hat 
requirement evidences appreciation of an important purpose of § 112, first paragraph, which is the 
definition of the attributes which a patent specification must possess as of the filing date to be entitled 
to that filing date as a prima facie date of invention." Application of Smith, 481 F.2d 910, 914 
(C.C.P.A. 1973) (holding that the how-to-use requirement was satisfied where there was no basis upon 
which to question use of all polymers within claimed genus, and where scope of genus was 
commensurate with specification disclosure). 
85 Gentry Gallery, Inc. v. Berkline Corp., 134 F.3d 1473, 1476 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (citing Markman,
52 F.3d at 979-81 (en banc), aff'd, 517 U.S. 370 (1996)). 
86 Id. at 1473 (holding the location of controls as limited to the console as "[n]o similar variation 
beyond the console is even suggested"). 
87 Enzo Biochem, 285 F.3d at 960-62. 
88 Enzo Biochem, 285 F.3d at 962. 
89 Enzo Biochem, 285 F.3d at 972 (holding that "reference in the specification to a deposit in a 
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genetic engineering, the court held that “[i]nventions that cannot reasonably be 
enabled by a description in written form in the specification, but that otherwise 
meet the requirements for patent protection, may be described in surrogate form by 
a deposit that is incorporated by reference into the specification.”90
In Enzo Biochem, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit effectively 
upheld the possession requirement in a case that did not involve priority.91 In a 
harbinger of the 2005-2006 cases discussed below, the Enzo Biochem dissent 
questioned the court’s decision not to hear the case en banc, as well as the court’s 
use of the possession test.92
d. Predictability of the Art 
The last facet of possession is whether the written description adequately 
discusses the claims for a person having skill in the art to understand all details of 
all embodiments in sufficient detail without undue experimentation, what the Court 
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has called “predictability of the relevant art.”93
In fact, the Court of Appeals for Federal Circuit has applied the possession 
doctrine almost exclusively to the complex, high-technology cases in the fields of 
material science, chemistry and biology, where the state of the art is rapidly 
changing.94 In these fields, a broadly-defined invention called the genus includes 
one or more narrowly-broadly defined inventions called the species.95 Such 
inventions are common in genetic engineering.96
Predictability looks beyond the written description to the knowledge of the 
person having skill in the field of science. This allows a patentee to rely on the 
knowledge of peers to understand how to make and use the invention.97 In this 
respect, the patentee can focus on the invention while expending less effort and 
                                                          
public depository, which makes its contents accessible to the public when it is not otherwise available in 
written form, constitutes an adequate description of the deposited material sufficient to comply with the 
written description requirement of § 112, para. 1", and denying a petition for en banc rehearing) 
(emphasis added). 
90 Enzo Biochem, 285 F.3d at 966. 
91 Id. at 960. 
92 Id. at 988 (Linn, J., dissenting). 
93 Plant Genetic Systems, N.V. v. DeKalb Genetics Corp., 315 F.3d 1335, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2003) 
(citing In re Vaeck, 947 F.2d 488, 495 (Fed. Cir.1991)). 
94 1970’s - Chemistry: Application of Smith, 481 F.2d 910 (C.C.P.A., 1973) (cationically active 
"living" polymers). Application of John P. Glass, 492 F.2d 1228 (C.C.P.A. 1974) (growth of crystals). 
1990’s - Material science in surgical devices: Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555 (Fed. Cir. 
1991) and Tronzo v. Biomet, Inc., 156 F.3d 1154 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Capon v. Eshhar, 418 F.3d 1349 
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (genetic inventions). 
95 Enzo Biochem, 323 F.3d at 966-67. See e.g., Genus-Species Manual of Patent Examining 
Procedures § 715.03, Markush Claims Manual of Patent Examining Procedures § 803.02, and Standard 
for Determining Compliance With the Written Description Requirement, Manual of Patent Examining 
Procedures § 2163.02 (8th ed. rev 6 2007). 
96 Capon v. Eshhar, 418 F.3d 1349, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (possession applied to genetic 
engineering). See also In re Vaeck, 947 F.2d 488 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (The application at issue was titled, 
"Hybrid Genes Incorporating a DNA Fragment Containing a Gene Coding for an Insecticidal Protein, 
Plasmids, Transformed Cyanobacteria Expressing Such Protein and Method for Use as a Biocontrol 
Agent"). 
97 Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 363 F.3d 1247, 1253 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citing AK Steel Corp. v. 
Sollac, 344 F.3d 1234, 1244 (Fed. Cir. 2003)). 
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funds documenting the knowledge of the person having ordinary skill in the art.98
For example, in Bilstad v. Wakalopulos, Bilstead’s application related to an 
“apparatus for sterilizing three-dimensional objects using ionizing radiation 
without affecting the target objects in a deleterious manner.”99 At issue was 
whether the patent application had to “describe every embodiment within the range 
of two to infinity to support the count.”100 The Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit found that the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences had not 
considered: “[W]hether [the] disclosure of manipulation in a small number of 
directions would reasonably convey to a person skilled in the relevant art that 
Bilstad had possession of manipulation in a plurality of directions as of his filing 
date.”101
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit therefore vacated the judgment 
of the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences and remanded for further 
proceedings.102 The court’s rationale was that not every specification needs the 
complete detail of every embodiment in the specification.103 This view does not 
apply to genetic engineering, where a description of a single species is insufficient 
for a claim to the genus, or for a description of the genus to claim the species, 
without a description of the species in the specification.104
Practitioners should note that while the possession test is not codified in law 
or through the rules, the Patent Office is including it in its examiner training under 
the “Guidelines for Examination of Patent Applications under 35 U.S.C. 112, 
paragraph 1, Written Description Requirement.” 
The purpose of the written description analysis is to confirm that applicant had 
possession of what is claimed. The Guidelines . . . instruct the examiner to look for 
consistency between a claim and what provides adequate factual support for the 
claim as judged by one of ordinary skill in the art from reading the corresponding 
written description.105
To assure the reader that the possession versus enablement confusion is still 
not yet corrected, the Patent Office provides this clarification: “The written 
description requirement, a question of fact, ensures that the inventor conveys to 
others that he or she had possession of the claimed invention; whereas, the 
enablement requirement, a question of law, ensures that the inventor conveys to 
                                                          
98 Whether billed by the hour or by the page, patent applications are time consuming and usually 
long. Applicants often file Information Disclosure Statements to separately provide that state of the art 
knowledge. On a related, but opposite side of the patenting coin is the Winslow test for obviousness. 
"[P]icture the inventor as working in his shop with the prior art references – which he is presumed to 
know – hanging on the walls around him." In re Winslow, 365 F.2d 1017, 1021 (CCPA 1966) (Rich, J.) 
99 Bilstad, 386 F.3d at 1118 . 
100 Id. at 1123. 
101 Id. at 1126. 
102 Id. at 1127. 
103 Id. at 1123-24 (citing In re Smythe, 480 F.2d 1376, 1382 (C.C.P.A. 1973)). 
104 Regents of the Univ. of California v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
105 66 Fed. Reg. 1099, 1100 at Comment (1), U.S. Dept. of Comm., U.S.P.T.O. (2001) (emphasis 
added). See also Manual of Patent Examining Procedures §2163 (8th ed. rev. 6 (2007)). 
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others how to make and use the claimed invention.”106
In all, perhaps the best explanation this author found is still from the 2003 
Amgen Court: 
The purpose of the written description requirement is to prevent an applicant from 
later asserting that he invented that which he did not; the applicant for a patent is 
therefore required to “recount his invention in such detail that his future claims can 
be determined to be encompassed within his original creation.107
While this is not the last word on the possession test in this article, the 
discussion of the evolution of the possession test is sufficient to introduce the 
Evolving Written Description Doctrine. 
III. THE BACKGROUND CASES
A. Introduction to the Evolving Written Description Doctrine 
In January 2006, Circuit Judge Rader dissented in the rehearing denial of 
LizardTech, Inc. v. Earth Resource Mapping, Inc., with an admonishment of the 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit for making what were, in his view, two 
contradictory rulings.108 In October 2005, a panel of the court had held in JVW
Enterprises, Inc. v. Interact Accessories, Inc.,109 that the claims can be broadly 
read to include an embodiment even if the embodiment is not expressly supported 
by the specification.110 The next day, a panel of different judges held in 
LizardTech that a claim is invalidated if all elements are not supported by the 
specification.111 On appeal by LizardTech for a re-hearing, the en banc court 
affirmed.112 In dissent to the en banc decision, Circuit Judge Rader called the court 
to task for allowing the JVW patentee to assert an embodiment the specification did 
not describe, while the court invalidated a claim that prevented the LizardTech
patentee from doing the same thing.113 Circuit Judge Rader called this apparent 
inconsistency the “evolving written description doctrine.”114 A minimally technical 
review is warranted as the art and facts of these cases are sufficiently different to 
affect the arguments. 
                                                          
106 66 Fed. Reg. 1099, 1100 at Comment (4), U.S. Dept. of Comm., U.S.P.T.O. (2001). See also
Manual of Patent Examining Procedures §2163 (8th ed. rev. 6 (2007)). 
107 Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Rousse, Inc., l314 F.3d 1313, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (citing Vas-
Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1991)). 
108 LizardTech, 433 F.3d at 1376. 
109 JVW Enterprises, Inc. v. Interact Accessories, Inc., 424 F.3d 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
110 LizardTech, 433 F.3d at 1376. 
111 LizardTech, 424 F.3d at 1336. 
112 LizardTech, 433 F.3d at 1376. 
113 Id. at 1377. 
114 Id. at 1377. 
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B. JVW and the Imported Function Doctrine 
1. The Patent at Issue: U.S. 4,494,754 
JVW owns United States Patent No. 4,494,754115 for an I-beam shaped 
device used for holding a video game controller.116 The invention relieves the user 
from having to manually hold the game controller during play. The patent claims 
an upper horizontal platform to hold the game controller that includes a “means for 
lockably receiving a video game controller in fixed position” on a mounting 
member.117 The patent claims both the video game controller holder, and ways of 
using the video game controller holder.118 While there are several drawings in the 
patent, every drawing shows the invention holding the same Atari joystick 
controller with the embodiments differing by how the user sat with the invention. 
2. Claim Construction and the District Court Ruling 
a. Claim Construction 
JVW sued Interact, a video game device manufacturer, for infringement by 
the Interact V3 and V4 steering wheel video game controllers.119 One point of 
contention in this case is that the patent shows an external holder for a video game 
controller, while the accused devices are video game controllers.120 In the patent, 
the “means” shown “for lockably receiving a video game controller in fixed 
position” are four flexible L-shaped clips outside the video game controller shown 
in the drawing.121 In its claim construction ruling, the district court considered this 
arrangement of the clips and the controller a necessary “interlace,” but 
acknowledged that the game controller was not part of the invention.122
                                                          
115 Apparatus For Playing Home Video Game, U.S. Patent No. 4,494,754 (issued Jan. 2, 1985). 
116 U.S. Patent No. 4,494,754, Fig. 1 and 2.. 
117 U.S. Patent No. 4,494,754, Col. 4. ll. 1-2 and ll. 33-35. "Mounting member" refers to the upper 
flat portion of the I-shaped invention. This is a classic "means-plus-function" claim under 35 U.S.C. § 
112, para. 6 (2006). The claim must describe a function of the invention, and provide an element in the 
invention to perform that function. 
118 Independent claims 1 and 5 provided different embodiments for the user to kneel or sit on the 
lower horizontal platform. U.S. Patent No. 4,494,754, Col. 3. ll. 47-48 (Claim 1), and Col. 4 ll. 27-29 
(Claim 5), and Col. 3, ll. 17-27 (describing Figures 4, 5 and 6.) Any use of the patented invention 
without a license is an infringement of the invention, 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2006). One goal of a patent is to 
provide as many variations of the invention as possible to provide protection for different uses. Claims 
for making or using an invention are best suited where the invention is not patentable for some reason. 
The issue in JVW is ironic in that the patent provides fewer embodiments of the invention holding the 
game controller than how the user is positioned for holding the invention. 
119 JVW Enters., 424 F.3d at 1327. 
120 See Figure 1 below for a side by side comparison. 
121 U.S. Patent No. 4,494,754, figs. 2 and 3, col. 2, ll. 39-45, col. 3. l. 50 col. 4. l. 2, and col. 4. ll. 
33-35. 
122 JVW Enters., 424 F.3d at 1328 (citing JVW Enters., Inc. v. Interact Accessories, Inc., No. 00-
CV-1867 (D. Md. May 9, 2002) ("Supplemental Memorandum and Order Re Patent Claim 
Construction")). There is disagreement in the patent bar, and on the bench, whether the accused product 
has a role in claim construction. Some courts perform claim construction 'blind' to the features of the 
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In the Interact models, the allegedly infringing clips are inside the housing of 
the video game controller.123 For JVW to succeed in its infringement action, JVW 
would have to prove that the Interact models infringe the patent by using identical 
or similar clips and that whether the clips were inside or outside the housing is 
irrelevant.124
Another claim construction issue was the district court’s interpretation of “in 
fixed position” and “means for lockably receiving” to require the invention to lock 
and unlock the controller in position.125 The specification lacked an express 
statement of how to remove the controller so the district court viewed the clips as 
immovable unless removed.126 In addition, the district court interpreted the 
pronounced horizontal portions of the L-clips as restraining the controller 
vertically as well as from side to side.127
b. Holding by the District Court 
One aspect that distinguishes the V3 and V4 video game controllers are the 
separable shells that move the clips away from the steering wheel to unlock and 
adjust the video game controller.128 Since this made the clips movable, the district 
court held there was no infringement as the V3 and V4 video game controllers 
lacked the interlace structure and the immovable function of the patented device.129
3. Errors by the District Court 
On appeal by JVW, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (2005) 
agreed that the “means for lockably receiving” claim was a valid means plus 
function claim.130 The court held though, that the district court’s claim 
construction violated two rules of means plus function interpretation.131 First, “a 
court may not construe a means-plus-function limitation ‘by adopting a function 
                                                          
accused product. 
123 Id. at 1327 ("The V3 utilizes plastic clips mounted inside a shell that surrounds a steering wheel 
column."). 
124 Markman, 517 U.S. at 374 ("Victory in an infringement suit requires a finding that the patent 
claim ‘covers the alleged infringer's product or process.’"); JVW Enters., 424 F.3d at 1333 ("The fact 
that the V3 adds a shell to allow the steering wheel height to be adjusted and a cam mechanism to 
provide a mechanical way to tighten and loosen the clips does not mean that the clips do not lock the 
steering wheel in a fixed position."). 
125 JVW Enters., 424 F.3d at 1328 (citing JVW Enters., Inc. v. Interact Accessories, Inc., No. 00-
CV-1867 (D, Md. Feb. 1, 2002) ("Memorandum and Order Re Patent Claim Construction")). 
126 JVW Enters., 424 F.3d at 1329. 
127 Figures 1, 2 and 3 show controller holders 21-24 in the same L-shape pattern and same 4-side 
configuration, This is the only, and stated, preferred embodiment of the invention. U.S. Patent No. 
4,494,754, col. 3, ll. 28-36. 
128 JVW Enters., 424 F.3d at 1329. 
129 Id. at 1329. 
130 Id. at 1329 ("The parties agree, as do we, that "means for lockably receiving a video game 
controller in fixed position on said mounting member" is a means-plus-function limitation recognized 
by 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6."). A means plus function claim allows a patentee to claim multiple 
embodiments through a specific format. 35 U.S.C. § 112  para. 6 (2006). 
131 "The first construction violated two tenets governing the determination of function in a means-
plus-function limitation." Id. at 1331. 
18 BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP & THE LAW Vol. I:1 
different from that explicitly recited in the claim.’”132 The court found that the 
district court had confused the separate functions of “fixed position” and “lockably 
receiving.”  The claims do not require the invention to both hold in place and 
unlock the video game controller.133  Thus, the district court erred in finding an 
interlacing of parts to lock and unlock the controller.134
The second rule is that a court may not “import[] the functions of a working 
device into the . . . specific claims,” but must “read[] the claims for their meaning 
independent of any working embodiment.”135 The court found that the district 
court had read into the claims a function for the L-shaped controller holders to 
“lock a controller into a fixed position by preventing linear, up and down 
movement of the [controller].”136 However, the claimed function is only to 
“lockably receiv[e] a video game controller in fixed position,” without regard to 
the direction of how the clips kept the controller from moving.137 The limitations 
imbued by the district court were merely functions of the separate structural 
elements present in the preferred embodiment138 to facilitate the claimed function 
to “lockably receiv[e] a video game controller in fixed position.”139 Since these 
were not claimed functions, the district court erred in requiring them.  The 
invention merely has to lock the controller in place, irrespective of the direction of 
limited motion.140
4. Infringement Analysis 
With a crucial exception, the Interact V3 and V4 video game controllers are 
quite alike. The V3 has L-shaped clips that surround the steering wheel column 
while the V4 has a donut shaped plate. The Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit (2005) found that the L-shaped clips on the accused V3 product performed 
the same function and were identical or equivalent to the L-shaped clips of the 
patent, and thus, the V3 model infringed the patent.141
With its donut-shaped plates surrounding the metal shaft, the V4 locks the 
controller from rotational motion rather than locking the controller from horizontal 
and vertical motion.142 Thus, the V4 did not infringe the patent as “the structures 
clearly perform the claimed function in substantially different ways.”143
Interact argued for non-infringement on grounds that the video game 
                                                          
132 JVW Enters., 424 F.3d at 1331 (citing Micro Chem., Inc. v. Great Plains Chem. Co., 194 F.3d 
1250, 1258 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). 
133 JVW Enters., 424 F.3d at 1331 ("[I]n its first construction the district court impermissibly added 
unclaimed functional limitations of "unlocking" and "releasing" the video game controller."). 
134 Id. at 1330. 
135 Id. at 1331 (citing Rodime PLC v. Seagate Tech., Inc., 174 F.3d 1294, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). 
136 JVW Enters., 424 F.3d at 1335. 
137 U.S. Patent No 4,494,754 col. 3 l. 50-col. 4 l. 2, col. 4 ll. 33-35. 
138 U.S. Patent No. 4,494,754 col. 3 ll. 28-36. 
139 U.S. Patent No. 4,494,754 col. 3 l. 50, col. 4 l.2, col. 4 ll. 33-35. 
140 JVW Enters., 424 F.3d at 1331. 
141 JVW Enters., 424 F.3d at 1333. 
142 Id. at 1335. 
143 Id. at 1335 (citing Odetics, Inc. v. Storage Tech. Corp., 185 F.3d 1259, 1267 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). 
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controllers are not intended “for playing a video game without any additional 
accessory,” while the only embodiment shown in the patent is a holder of video 
game controllers.144 The court disagreed, saying it “would be improper” to “import 
limitations into claims from . . . embodiments appearing only in a patent’s written 
description . . . unless the specification makes clear that “the patentee . . . intends 
for the claims and the embodiments in the specification to be strictly 
coextensive.”145
The court opined that “after reviewing the specification, we conclude that the 
patentee did not intend for the claims and the embodiments disclosed in the 
specification to be coextensive.”146 This meant the court was willing to accept a 
broad view of the claims even though the written description did not support such a 
view because the patent did not express the narrow view argued by Interact. The 
reader may note the court reversed the district court’s construction for interlacing 
and directionally applied locking for the same reason.147 While the opinion did not 
expressly state to what part of the specification the court was referring to, this 
author believes the court merely compared Figure 5 to the Interact video game 
controllers. This author prepared such a comparison, which is Figure 1 below this 
section. The reader will likely note the striking similarities. 
5. Discussion and Summary on JVW 
There are two problems with the court’s decision. For one, the holding of 
infringement by the V3 ignores that the court went inside the V3 to find the 
infringing L-clips. Logically, a video game controller cannot infringe a device 
intended to hold the video game controller. This is analogous to looking inside the 
Atari controller shown in the drawings and finding infringement. This is the prior 
art-infringement dichotomy of “that which infringes if later, would anticipate if 
earlier.”148 As such, the court could have affirmed the district court holding of non-
infringement, and invalidated the patent as anticipated by the Atari controller.149
The second problem is the court’s finding of the V3 as infringing, but the V4 
as not infringing. The court described the patented invention as one which “the 
player may sit or kneel on the base of the accessory with his or her legs on either 
side of the riser,” [with] “the controller [] held in place by the controller holders 
and stabilized using the player’s weight.”150 As noted above, the court apparently 
saw the striking similarity of the V3 to the JVW patented invention. As a matter of 
law, the finding of infringement is consistent with the purpose of the means-plus-
function limitation and the doctrine of equivalents to prevent such subversion of 
                                                          
144 Id. at 1335. 
145 Id.; see also Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323 (en banc). 
146 Id. at 1335. 
147 Id. at 1331 (citing Rodime PLC v. Seagate Tech., Inc., 174 F.3d 1294, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). 
148 Peters v. Active Mfg. Co., 129 U.S. 530, 537 (1889). 
149 We can only speculate what might have happened had the same panel judges as LizardTech
made the decision. 
150 JVW Enters., 424 F.3d at 1327 (citing U.S. Patent No. 4,494,754 col.3 ll.13-28, col.1 ll.42- 47). 
20 BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP & THE LAW Vol. I:1 
patented ideas by insubstantial differences.151 A finding of non-infringement by 
the V3 would allow the wholesale copying of patented devices. 
The finding of non-infringement for the V4 model is somewhat perplexing. 
The two models are identical except for the ability of the V4 to “lock a controller 
into a fixed position by preventing rotational movement of the steering wheel unit 
on the shaft.”152 The JVW patent does not claim a limitation to only “lock a 
controller into a fixed position by preventing linear, up and down movement of the 
steering wheel column.”153 This is the limitation of the preferred embodiment L-
clips, shown for “lockably receiving [an Atari] video game controller in fixed 
position.”154 The court said that the district court erred by imputing a strict locking 
function of the L-clips to the patented invention.155 Yet, the court distinguished the 
linear locking function of the patented invention as justifying non-infringement by 
the V4.156 If the court can see through the distinction that Interact copied the whole 
of the JVW patented device for the V3, why did the court not see that the donut-
shaped plates of the V4 were merely a means for “lockably receiving [the Interact 
V4] video game controller in fixed position?”157
Figure 1. Comparative Diagram of JVW158 and Interact V3159
U.S. Patent No. 4,494,754 figure 5 compared the Interact V3 (Image 
©Amazon.com) 
                                                          
151 Id. at 1333 (citing Odetics, 185 F.3d at 1267). 
152 Id. at 1335. 
153 Id. at 1335. 
154 U.S. Patent No.  4,494,754 col. 4 ll. 1-2. 
155 JVW Enters., 424 F.3d at 1335. For purposes of 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006), the drawings are part of 
the written description. In other regards, the drawings are t rules make a separate requirement. 35 
U.S.C. § 111(a)(2) (2006). 
156 Id.
157 Id.
158 U.S. Patent No. 4,494,754 fig. 5. 
159 Image (http://ec1.images-amazon.com/images/P/B00000JDDY.01._SS500_SCLZZZZZZZ_.gif) 
available at http://www.amazon.com/Interact-SV280-V3-Racing-Wheel/dp/B00000JDDY (last visited 
Mar. 18, 2007). 
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C. LizardTech And The Possession Test160
1. The Patent At Issue: U.S. Patent No. 5,710,835 
LizardTech, Inc. is the exclusive licensee of U.S. Patent No. 5,710,835 
(issued January 20, 1998) for use of a set of mathematical formulas in software, 
called Digital Wavelet Transform algorithms, which compress digital images 
without creating fuzzy edges.161 If the reader were to look at the software code that 
makes a digital image, the reader would find many rows and columns of digital 
data, as if looking at a giant Sudoku puzzle.162 The LizardTech patented method 
mathematically divided the image into a mosaic of digital tiles before running the 
non-patented software algorithms.163 LizardTech alleged infringement by the 
competing Earth Resource Mapping (ERM) method (“ER Mapper”), which ran 
each individual row and column of digital data through the non-patented software 
algorithms.164
2. Claim Construction Issues165
The parties litigated the patent through two hearings and three appeals 
without going to trial.166 The first hearing related to claim construction of the term 
“tile” as used in the patent.167 The district court (in 2000) held that the LizardTech 
tile method did not include the single pixel row method used by ERM and granted 
summary judgment to ERM for non-infringement.168 On appeal by LizardTech (in 
2002), the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed this claim 
construction, and rejected alternative arguments by ERM that the terms “selected 
sequence” and “maintaining updated sums” excluded the ER Mapper method.169
Even so, the appeal ruling did not help Lizardtech. On remand, the district 
                                                          
160 LizardTech, 424 F.3d at 1336. 
161 Id. at 1337. 
162 The district court case (cited infra) as well as Deposition of Stuart Nixon provide a brief 
discussion of the technology. LizardTech v. Earth Resource Mapping, 2000 WL 34502412 (W.D. Wash 
2000). The interested reader will find references of varying complexity, including Apparatus for image 
manipulation, Everett Truman Eiselen, U.S. Patent 3,976,982 (issued Aug, 24, 1976).  The patent at 
issue provides a more state of the art discussion.  Samples and explanations of Suduko are online at 
many sites. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Suduko (last visited Oct. 20, 2007). 
163 LizardTech v. Earth Resource Mapping, 2000 WL 35453681 at 1 (W.D. Wash. 2000). The 
reader can simulate the tiling method by marking a grid, such as a 3x3 tic-tac-toe grid, over a picture. 
164 Id. A digital image is like a mosaic, but made of dots on the computer screen, called pixels, 
rather than of small pictures. The reader can verify this by using the zoom tool of most image-viewing 
software to step progressively upwards through the zoom factors. At some point, the image will become 
fuzzy with solid squares of color. 
165 For clarity, words such as "information, "data, "process" or "method" replace various technical 
terms and phrases from the patent and the proceedings that are not significant to the patent principles on 
which this discussion focuses. 
166 LizardTech, 2000 WL 35453681 at 1 (W.D. Wash. 2000). 
167 Id. at 3. 
168 LizardTech, 2000 WL 35453681. 
169 LizardTech, 35 Fed. Appx. 918 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
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court (2004) construed “seamless” such that the ER Mapper method did not follow 
the same steps as the patented method.170 Additionally, the district court construed 
that the terms “overlapping” and “maintaining updated sums” excluded the ER 
Mapper method.171 Thus, “the district court held on summary judgment that ERM 
did not infringe claims 1 and 13 of the ‘835 patent.”172
3. Invalidation for Lacking Possession 
Claims 1 and 21 were very similar, and would have been identical, except 
that claim 21 lacked the terms, “maintaining updated sums,” “periodically 
compressing said sums” and “seamless.”173 This difference in the claims is 
acceptable as long as the claims can be read to refer to different inventions, i.e.,
claim 21 cannot be the same invention as claim 1. 
Thus, the district court viewed claim 21 as referring to a non-seamless 
process.174 The district court also viewed the written description as explaining the 
workings of a seamless process, but not explaining a non-seamless process.175 The 
court held that a person having ordinary skill in the art would not understand how 
to make and use the non-seamless invention.176 For this reason, the district court 
held claim 21 and its dependent claims as indefinite and invalid.177
On appeal (2005), LizardTech had a two-fold problem. One problem was 
that LizardTech could not argue that claim 21 impliedly included all three missing 
elements, as then claim 21 would be the same as claim 1 and still invalid. To avoid 
this interpretation, LizardTech argued that based on the entire specification, an 
ordinary person skilled in the art would understand that the seamless process 
applied also to claim 21.178 Citing the prosecution history, the Court of Appeals for 
the Federal Circuit (2005) agreed with LizardTech.179
There still remained the problem of claim 21 lacking the elements of 
“maintaining updated sums” and “periodically compressing said sums.”180 For 
claim 21 to be valid, LizardTech had to show the claim could be read to perform a 
seamless process without use of “maintaining updated sums,” and “periodically 
compressing said sums.”181 The next step is looking to the patent for such “full, 
clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art,” how to 
                                                          
170 LizardTech, 424 F.3d at 1339, 1340-41 (2005). The remand opinion is LizardTech, Inc. v. Earth 
Res. Mapping, Inc., 2004 WL 34502412 (W.D.Wash. March 14, 2004). 
171 Id. at 1342-43. See also, Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582 (holding that a patentee cannot construe a 
term to have different meanings in different claims) (citing Hoescht Celanese Corp. v. BP Chem. Ltd., 
78 F.3d 1575, 1578 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 275 (1996). 
172 Id. at 1340-41. 
173 Id. at 1343 (citing U.S. Patent No. 5,710,835). 
174 Id.
175 Id.
176 LizardTech, 424 F.3d at 1343. 
177 LizardTech, 424 F.3d at 1343. 
178 Id. at 1343. 
179 Id. See e.g., Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315 (en banc). 
180 LizardTech, 424 F.3d at  1343. 
181 Id. at 1344. 
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make and use the invention.182 There, the court found a problem.  The 
“specification provides only a single way of creating a seamless [process], which is 
by maintaining updated sums. There is no evidence that the specification 
contemplates a more generic way of creating a seamless [process].”183
As this point, the court had clear precedent to invalidate claim 21 based on 
the §112(1) enablement clause.184  The court showed this understanding in two 
ways. For one, the court cited another enablement case that proved its point.185
Second, the court reiterated enablement as the reason for invalidation. “After 
reading the patent, a person of skill in the art would not understand how to make a 
seamless [process] generically and would not understand LizardTech to have 
invented a method for making a seamless [process], except by ‘maintaining 
updating sums.’”186
Instead, the court oddly diverged into the best mode requirement, mixed in 
the enablement clause and invoked an old quid pro quo case.187 As though to 
justify this mix, the court then once again linked the enablement clause to the 
possession doctrine. “Those two requirements usually rise and fall together. [A] 
recitation of how to make and use the invention across the full breadth of the claim 
is ordinarily sufficient to demonstrate that the inventor possesses the full scope of 
the invention, and vice versa.”188
As noted above, the possession test has previously been held only to 
complex, high-technology subject matter in the material science, chemistry and 
biological arts.189 Here, the court held the possession test to a software patent, 
which has not before been subjected to the possession test.  In addition, with 
apparent knowledge and disregard, the court resurrected the pre-Vas-Cath
enablement-possession confusion.190
Whether the flaw in the specification is regarded as a failure to demonstrate that 
the patentee possessed the full scope of the invention recited in claim 21 or a failure 
to enable the full breadth of that claim, the specification provides inadequate 
support for the claim under section 112, paragraph one. 
This statement suffers three problems. First, the court failed to keep written 
description and enablement separate as stated by the Moba court.191 Second, the 
court failed to provide an interpretation of the judicial and statutory policies the 
                                                          
182 Id (citing 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006)). 
183 LizardTech, 424 F.3d at 1344. 
184 The written description shall provide "the manner and process of making and using it, in such 
full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art ... to make and use the 
same." 35 U.S.C. § 112, para. 1 (2006). 
185 LizardTech, 424 F.3d at 1345 (citing AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac & Ugine, 344 F.3d 1234, 1244 
(Fed. Cir. 2003)). 
186 LizardTech, 424 F.3d at 1345 (emphasis added). 
187 LizardTech, 424 F.3d at 1344. 
188 LizardTech, 424 F.3d at 1345 (emphasis added). 
189 See supra Predictability of the Art, Part I.C.4. 
190 LizardTech, 424 F.3d at 1345 (emphasis added). 
191 Moba, B.V. v. Diamond Automation, Inc., 325 F.3d 1306, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (Bryson, J., 
concurring). 
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court was attempting to invoke with the possession doctrine. Lastly, in citing the 
missing claim element as the cause of invalidity, the court failed to recognize it 
was invoking the requirement that the claims shall “particularly point[] out and 
distinctly claim[] the subject matter which the applicant regards as his 
invention.”192 Presuming that what the court said is true, in prosecution, such a 
claim would fail the definiteness requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112 paragraph 2 and 
the enablement requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112 paragraph 1. Such unsupported 
claims are called omnibus claims because “it is indefinite in that it fails to point out 
what is included or excluded by the claim language.”193
The seminal case for omnibus claims is O’Reilly v. Morse.194 Morse had 
invented the telegraph and sued O’Reilly for infringement of Morse’s eighth claim, 
which stated: 
I do not propose to limit myself to the specific machinery or parts of machinery 
described in the foregoing specification and claims; the essence of my invention 
being the use of the motive power of the electric or galvanic current, which I call 
electro-magnetism, however developed, for making or printing intelligible 
characters, signs or letters, at any distances, being a new application of that power, 
of which I claim to be the first inventor or discoverer.195
As here, omnibus claims attempt to provide patent coverage for related 
inventions that the inventor has not invented. As Morse claimed, “I do not propose 
to limit [my invention to the] specifications and claims.”196 At that time though, 
claims were a relatively new addition to patents. Even so, Chief Justice Taney 
recognized that “this claim can derive no aid from the specification filed. It is 
outside of it, and the patentee claims beyond it.”197 Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court 
invalidated the claim.198 The LizardTech court recognized the similarity of the 
situation in citing Morse.199
Adopting LizardTech’s argument “would lead to sweeping, overbroad claims 
because it would entitle an inventor to a claim scope far greater than what a person 
of skill in the art would understand the inventor to possess or what a person of skill 
in the art would be enabled to make and use. 
So clearly, the court understood that claim 21 was invalid, either by failure 
of the enablement clause of 35 U.S.C. § 112 paragraph 1, or the definiteness clause 
of paragraph 2. Consequently, the court’s citing of the possession test here is 
perplexing.200
                                                          
192 35 U.S.C. § 112 para. 2 (2006). 
193 Omnibus Claim, Manual of Patent Examining Procedures §2173.05(r) (8th ed. rev 6 2007), 
(citing Ex parte Fressola, 27 USPQ2d 1608 (Bd. Pat. App. & Inter. 1993). 
194 O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62 (1853). 
195 Id.
196 Id.
197 O’Reilly, 56 U.S. at 119-20. 
198 Id. at 136-37. 
199 LizardTech, 424 F.3d at 1346. 
200 LizardTech, 424 F.3d at 1345. 
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4. Per Curiam Denial of Rehearing 
LizardTech petitioned for a re-hearing by the court or an en banc appeal.201
The court (2006) denied the petition as did the circuit judges polled for an en banc 
appeal.202 Circuit Judge Lourie wrote a concurring opinion, while Circuit Judge 
Rader dissented. In the concurrence, Circuit Judge Lourie raised eight arguments 
in support of the petition denial. These were:203
(a) Case law has been consistent upholding 35 U.S.C. § 112; 
(b) That quid pro quo required a full disclosure; 
(c) The disclosure failed to meet the full disclosure requirements; 
(d) The facts here are different than in other cases; 
(e) The disclosure failed the possession test (without calling it that); 
(f) The preferred embodiment did not support the claim; 
(g) 35 U.S.C. §132 bars new matter and that 35 U.S.C. §112 does not so 
apply, and 
(h) The court has at least twice declined to hear a written description case en 
banc. 
As discussed below, these arguments implicate that the Court of Appeals for 
the Federal Circuit is both improperly invoking the possession test, and raising the 
standard for showing possession. Due to the expansiveness of judicial doctrine in 
the opinion, this article will discuss each argument separately. 
5. Concurring Opinion and Counterarguments 
a. Does Judicial Doctrine Rule Over the Statute? 
The concurrence purportedly supported the invalidation of claim 21. Instead, 
it served to show that the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is divisive in the 
interpretation of 35 U.S.C. § 112. First, Circuit Judge Lourie opened his arguments 
with judicial doctrine. “Our case law has been quite consistent in holding that the 
patent law requires that a patent contain a written description of a claimed 
invention independent of the requirements to enable one skilled in the art to make 
and use the invention.”204
Second, Circuit Judge Lourie argues that there is by “statute, policy, and 
practice,” “a written description [requirement] . . . independent of the requirement 
[] to enable one skilled in the art to make and use the invention.”205 As support, 
Circuit Judge Lourie quotes the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112, with emphasis 
on the “and” between the written description requirement in the statute, and the 
enablement clause.206 Circuit Judge Lourie adds two instances of comporting case 
                                                          
201 LizardTech, 433 F.3d at 1374 (denying en banc rehearing). 
202 Id.
203 LizardTech, 433 F.3d at 1374-76 (Lourie, J., concurring). 
204 LizardTech, 433 F.3d at 1374 (Lourie, J., concurring). 
205 Id.
206 Id.
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law.207
However, this first set of arguments suffers from two problems. The first 
problem is the choice of order in the arguments. First, rather than citing the statute, 
Circuit Judge Lourie cites judicial doctrine (“[o]ur case law has been quite 
consistent”), as though judicial doctrine on written description had overruled the 
statute, which as yet the court has not done.208 In Marbury, the U.S. Supreme 
Court said the role of the judiciary is interpretation, thus the first argument is the 
statute, not judicial doctrine.209 Second, these arguments are irrelevant. The 
statutory requirements for enablement, best mode and definiteness are not 
challenged here, nor have they been recently challenged. In this case, and the other 
cases cited here, the parties were not challenging the statutes, but rather the judicial 
interpretation of the statute. 
b. Applying Quid Pro Quo to the Written Description 
Circuit Judge Lourie then cited the quid pro quo doctrine, saying it is self-
evident public policy applied to the entirety of the written description. 
The whole purpose of a patent specification is to disclose one’s invention to the 
public. It is the quid pro quo for the grant of the period of exclusivity. The need to 
tell the public what the invention is, in addition to how to make and use it, is self-
evident. One should not be able to obtain a patent on what one has not disclosed to 
the public.210
This argument is subject to challenge on multiple fronts. The first challenge 
is that quid pro quo as applied to patent law does not involve 35 U.S.C. §112, but 
rather the legitimate use of the patent. The first use of quid pro quo arose from the 
1836 patent law that “authorized the extension of a patent, on the application of the 
executor or administrator of a deceased patentee.”211 However, a licensee of the 
patent could not use the extension.212 While the law disappeared, the doctrine did 
not. The U.S. Supreme Court later cited the doctrine as justification for the 
“exclusive right” exception to monopoly and antitrust law giving a patentee a 
limited licensing right without violating the Sherman Antitrust Act (15 U.S.C. §1, 
et. seq.).213  These cases present the quid pro quo doctrine as a use doctrine, not a 
patentability doctrine. 
This view is supported by a 1974 case in which the U.S. Supreme Court had 
to determine whether federal preemption applies to state laws that protect 
unpatentable trade secrets much as patent law would protect them, if they were 
                                                          
207 LizardTech, 433 F.3d at 1374-75 (Lourie, J., concurring) (citing Invitrogen Corp. v. Clontech 
Labs., Inc., 429 F.3d 1052, 1071 n. 17 (Fed.Cir. 2005), and Capon v. Eshhar, 418 F.3d 1349, 1360 
(Fed.Cir. 2005)). 
208 LizardTech, 433 F.3d at 1374 (Lourie, J., concurring) 
209 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803). 
210 LizardTech, 433 F.3d at 1375 (Lourie, J., concurring). 
211 Wilson v. Rousseau, 45 U.S. 646, 647 (1846). 
212 Woodworth v. Sherman, 30 F. Cas. 586, 589 (Cir. Ct. Mass. 1844) (holding, inter alia, that an 
assignee could not get an extension since the patentee did not have the right to grant the extension). 
213 Simpson v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 377 U.S. 13, 24 (1964) (holding that a consignment license 
coerced on lessees is illegal under anti-trust laws). 
2007 THE “EVOLVING WRITTEN DESCRIPTION DOCTRINE” 27 
patentable.214 In Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp, the U.S. Supreme Court 
recognized that the limited monopoly of patents, i.e., the open use of the patented 
invention, served as an incentive (the quid pro quo) to “full disclosure.”  “The 
more difficult objective of the patent law to reconcile with trade secret law is that 
of disclosure, the quid pro quo of the right to exclude.”215
In Kewanee, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that allowing protection of 
trade secrets provides the same use incentive to businesses that did not need, 
qualify for, or could not afford patent protection.216 The problem before the Court 
was how to strike a proper balance between undisclosed, but state protected trade 
secrets, and disclosed, but federally protected ideas. 
[S]tate rules which would grant such incentives seem to conflict with the economic 
quid pro quo underlying patent protection; i.e., a monopoly limited in time, in 
return for full disclosure of the invention. Thus[,] federal law has struck a balance 
between incentives for inventors and the public’s right to a competitive economy. 
In this sense, the patent law is an integral part of federal competitive policy.217
The difficulty for businesses is that trade secrets can keep a business in 
business for decades, as with Coca-Cola, which has been a trade secret for some 
120 years.218 A patent, on the other hand, provides only a limited monopoly for a 
fraction of that time.219 At expiration, everyone can legally make, sell and use the 
invention with impunity.220 Thus, by ruling that federal patent law did not preempt 
the state trade secret law, the Kewanee Court affirmed the quid pro quo doctrine as 
a balancing factor in the competitive decisions made by businesses of whether to 
maintain a trade secret or seek patent protection, without regard to the disclosure of 
the application.221
Other cases involving patents have also focused on the individual actions of 
the patentee/assignee in competition, rather than on the disclosure.222 In Rite-Hite
                                                          
214 Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 472 (1974). 
215 Id. at 484 (citing Universal Oil Co. v. Globe Co., 322 U.S. 471, 484 (1944)). 
216 Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 474. 
217 Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 497, n.2 (holding that a state law granting monopoly protection to 
processes and manufacturing techniques by barring disclosure of unpatentable trade secrets does not 
violate federal patent law) (quoting Adelman, Secrecy and Patenting: Some Proposals for Resolving the 
Conflict, 1 APLA QUARTERLY JOURNAL 296, 298-99 (1973)). 
218 See e.g., The Chronicle Of Coca-Cola, available at http://www.thecoca-colacompany.com/ 
heritage/chronicle_birth_refreshing_idea.html; or The History of Coca Cola, available at
http://inventors.about.com/od/cstartinventions/a/coca_cola.htm. (Last visited Oct. 20, 2007). 
219 A patent grants the patentee "the right to exclude others from [importing into,] making, using, 
offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout the United States" for a term of 20 years from the 
earlier of the filing or priority date. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a) (2006). 
220 35 U.S.C. § 271(a)(1) (2006)(prohibiting the making, using, offering to sell, sale or importing of 
any patented invention within the United States without authority during the term of the patent). 
221 The federal trade secret protection statutes, i.e., 18 U.S.C. § 1831-1839, have been on the books 
since 1996. Just as with the patent statutes, these statutes do not, and cannot, address the competitive 
cost-benefit analysis necessary for whether a business should seek a patent or keep the information a 
trade secret. Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 484-491. 
222 See e.g. Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1997-02 (9th Cir. 
1997) (holding that a monopolist's exclusion of others from its intellectual property by refusing to 
license or sell its intellectual property is a presumptively valid business justification to exclusionary 
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(1995), the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit placed emphasis of the quid 
pro quo doctrine on the marketplace, not patentability.223 Even the most recent 
U.S. Supreme Court case has not departed from that role.224
The second difficulty is that cases that have tied quid pro quo to the written 
description doctrine have conditioned the link to public use of the invention. In the 
first case linking quid pro quo to the written description, a district court applied 
quid pro quo to the best mode requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112.225 In Systematic 
Tool & Mach. Co., the district court said that “disclosure of the best method of 
performing the task the patent is intended to accomplish [is the] the quid pro quo
for the grant of a legal monopoly over the subject matter, so that the public may 
obtain maximum benefits through complete revelation by the patentee.”226
According to the Systematic court, the quid pro quo doctrine focuses on the best 
benefit of the invention, not the enablement (make and use) clauses of §112(1).227
Unlike Systematic Tool & Mach. Co., Lizardtech was not a question of validity 
under the best mode requirement—which also was not mentioned in the opinion 
other than in one short reference.228
Not too long ago, the U.S. Supreme Court looked at the relationship of the 
quid pro quo doctrine to the written description.229 In J. E. M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. 
Pioneer Hi-Bred International, the U.S. Supreme Court said that “to obtain a 
utility patent, a breeder must describe the plant with sufficient specificity to enable 
others to “make and use” the invention after the patent term expires. The 
disclosure required by the Patent Act is “the quid pro quo of the right to 
exclude.”230
There are, however, distinguishing factors between J. E. M. Ag Supply and 
LizardTech.  First, in J. E. M. Ag Supply, the U.S. Supreme Court faced the 
question of whether newly developed plant breeds are patentable subject matter 
where Congress provides for utility patents under 35 U.S.C. § 101, plant patents 
under the Plant Protection Act (35 U.S.C. §§ 161-164) and Plant Variety 
Certificates under the Plant Variety Protection Act (84 Stat. 1542, as amended, 7 
U.S.C. § 2321 et. seq.).231 The patentability question in LizardTech was limited 
                                                          
conduct for any immediate harm to consumers). 
223 Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., Inc., 56 F.3d 1538, 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (holding that "[t]he 
patent system was not designed merely to build up a library of information by disclosure, … but [is] to 
get new products into the marketplace during the period of exclusivity so that the public receives full 
benefits from the grant") (internal citation omitted) (emphasis added). 
224 Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006) (holding that a patent does not 
necessarily confer market power upon the patentee and requiring a plaintiff prove a patentee/defendant 
has market power in the tying product). 
225 The specification shall . . . set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out 
his invention.  35 U.S.C. § 112(1) (2006). 
226 Systematic Tool & Mach. Co. v. Walter Kidde & Co., Inc., 390 F.Supp. 178, 195-96 (E.D. Pa. 
1975) (rev'd on other grounds, 555 F.2d 342 (3rd Cir. 1977)) (emphasis added). 
227 Id.
228 LizardTech, 424 F.3d at 1344. 
229 J. E. M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 127 (2001). 
230 J. E. M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 142 (2001) (emphasis 
added) (citing Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 484 (1974) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 112). 
231 Id. at 127 (holding that newly developed plant breeds are patentable subject matter of § 101, and 
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strictly to the scope of the disclosure in support of the claims.232 Second, in most 
patent cases, the Court uses the broader, and more common term, patentee.233
Here, the Court does not refer to a patentee, but to the breeder.234 Thus, the focus 
in J. E. M. Ag Supply is not on an inventor, but on a person working with live 
biological materials. In addition, plant inventions are subject to the biological 
deposit requirement of 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.801-1.809 because of “the practical 
difficulties of describing unique biological materials in a written description.”235 A 
deposit is not required, optional, or even allowed for a software invention.236
In general, the quid pro quo doctrine is intended to entice a patentee to place 
the invention in the marketplace with the limited “right to exclude.”237 The 
distinguishing factors between J. E. M. Ag Supply and LizardTech make it clear 
that applying quid pro quo to the entirety of the written description must be limited 
to the cases where there are “practical difficulties of describing [the invention] in a 
written description.”238 Consequently, application of the quid pro quo doctrine to 
the possession test is limited to specific subject matter, just as courts in the past 
have done for genus-species patents.239
c. Patent Practice 
Circuit Judge Lourie then notes that patent applications provide for two parts 
in the specification describing the invention, a “substantive portion of a patent 
specification” and “a fuller written description of what the invention is.”240 By 
substantive portion, Circuit Judge Lourie was referring to the claims, as shown by 
the statement that “[a] patent specification always begins with a statement like ‘My 
invention consists of.’” 241
Circuit Judge Lourie argues, “[n]o one writes a patent application by 
beginning with statements like ‘I make my invention as follows’ or ‘I use my 
invention in the following manner.’”242 However, this argument ignores the patent 
laws and policy with which Circuit Judge Lourie seeks to support the denial of re-
                                                          
neither the PPA nor the PVPA limits the scope of § 101 coverage).
232 LizardTech, 424 F.3d at 1344-1345. 
233 See e.g., Ill. Tool Works v. Indep. Ink, 547 U.S. 28 (2005), and eBay Inc v. MercExchange, 
L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006) LizardTech, 424 F. 3d 1344-1345. 
234 J. E. M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 142 (2001) (emphasis 
added) (citing Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 484 (1974). 
235 Enzo Biochem, 323 F.3d at 965. 
236 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.801-1.809 (2001) (limiting deposits to biological materials). The PTO may 
require a model. 35 U.S.C. § 114 (2007). A model will not otherwise be admitted without approval 
from the PTO. 37 C.F.R. § 1.91 (2007). A perpetual motion invention is the only other required 
working model.  Manual of Patent Examining Procedures § 608.03 (8th ed. rev 6 (2007)). 
237 Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 497. 
238 Enzo Biochem, 323 F.3d at 965 (applying quid pro quo to requiring biological deposits when a 
written description would be inadequate disclosure). 
239 Enzo Biochem, 323 F.3d at 966-67. See also, Genus-Species Manual of Patent Examining 
Procedures § 715.03 and Markush Claims Manual of Patent Examining Procedures § 803.02 (8th ed. 
rev 6 (2007)). 
240 LizardTech, 433 F.3d at 1375 (Lourie, J., concurring). 
241 Id. at 1375 (Lourie, J., concurring). See also 37 C.F.R. §1.75(e) (2006). 
242 Id. at 1375 (Lourie, J., concurring). 
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hearing.243 While the phrases alluded to by Circuit Judge Lourie are provided for 
by the enablement clause of 35 U.S.C. § 112, the rules clearly state such a 
discussion is part of the Brief Description, and the Detailed Description of the 
Invention parts of the application.244
In addition, no one could use such a phrase in a claim as described by Circuit 
Judge Lourie because the application would not pass examination. The patent rules 
expressly prescribe that the preamble use language such as “I claim,” or “we 
claim,” followed by “consisting of,” “comprising of,” or another comporting 
phrase.245 The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has held that the patent 
rules are procedural in nature, and are not substantive for barring a patent for 
procedural non-compliance.246 While Circuit Judge Lourie is correct in saying that 
no one uses these phrases, the enablement clause is irrelevant to his argument.247
d. Inconsistencies 
Circuit Judge Lourie next seeks to justify the Court’s denial on re-hearing on 
grounds that the facts here are different from other cases.248 The argument fails as 
the facts here are just as sufficiently different to not justify the Court’s decision. If 
anything, applying the possession test to a case involving software is a case of first 
impression that requires an en banc review. 
e.  Passing the Opportunity 
Circuit Judge Lourie next seemingly bypassed the opportunity to address the 
fundamental issues of the LizardTech (2005) opinion.249 Circuit Judge Lourie first 
states that the claims “must be interpreted, in light of the written description, but 
not beyond it, because otherwise they would be interpreted to cover inventions or 
aspects of an invention that have not been disclosed.”250 Though sounding as an 
anti-omnibus claim argument, the test is whether the “written description . . . 
reasonably convey[s] to a person skilled in the art that [the inventor] had 
possession of the claimed subject matter at the time of filing.”251 This is the same 
rule cited by the LizardTech (2005) court.252 The error by the LizardTech (2005) 
court and Circuit Judge Lourie is that “the [court] never truly discussed the 
                                                          
243 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006). 
244 LizardTech, 433 F.3d at 1375 (Lourie, J., concurring) (the patent rules, specifically 37 C.F.R. 
§1.77(b) (2006), prescribe the order of the descriptive sections in a patent application). 
245 Form of Claims, Manual of Patent Examining Procedures § 608.01(m) (8th ed. rev 6 2007). See
also 37 C.F.R. §1.75(e) (2006). 
246 Fressola v. Manbeck,1995 WL 656874 (D.D.C. March 30, 1995) (upholding the one-sentence 
rule of Manual of Patent Examining Procedures § 608.01(m) (5th ed. 1989)). 
247 LizardTech, 433 F.3d at 1375 (Lourie, J., concurring). 
248 Id.
249 Id.
250 Id.
251 Bilstad, 386 F.3d 1116, 1125 (holding that the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences erred 
in requiring a patent application for an electronic sterilization apparatus to describe every embodiment 
within the range construction and not recognizing that a person skilled in the art would readily discern 
that other members of the genus would perform similarly to the disclosed members). 
252 LizardTech, 424 F.3d at 1345-46 (citing In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
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understandings of persons skilled in the art.”253 The court should have at least 
remanded for a re-hearing to ascertain the skill in the art instead of repeatedly 
pointing to the specification.254
This case and the other cited cases here also raise the appropriateness of the 
possession test to the fields of software and the technology-related electronic arts. 
255 The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has generally applied the 
possession test only to the fields of material science, chemistry and the biological 
arts.256 It is therefore odd that Circuit Judge Lourie alludes that the possession test 
is inapplicable here while expressly averting a discussion on the possession test on 
grounds “that [it] is a more complex topic having its own subtleties.”257
This disclaimer creates a problem of precedent. The first cases of the 
possession test involved patents invoking earlier filed documents or reference 
material, or were matters such as genus-species claims.258 The LizardTech patent 
does not rely on earlier filed documents or reference material and the image 
compression algorithm does not involve a genus-species claim.259 Nor is this 
patent the type of subject matter the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has 
said applies the possession test.260 Yet, the LizardTech (2005) court clearly stated 
it was relying on the possession test, providing additional grounds for a re-
hearing.261 By denying a rehearing, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is 
doing just what Circuit Judge Lourie stated the court was not doing in Enzo 
Biochem, i.e., “elevat[ing] possession [as] a statutory test of patentability,” or in 
other words, “lowering the bar” for using the possession test.262
f. Elucidated Embodiment Test 
Circuit Judge Lourie next says that “[c]laims are not necessarily limited to 
preferred embodiments.”263 In this, Circuit Judge Lourie is correct. In Scimed, the 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit said that a patentee may rely on, and does 
not have to disclose, the knowledge of a person having skill in the art for 
interpretation of the embodiments.264 In addition, the doctrine of equivalence 
allows a patentee to extend the scope of the embodiments to equivalents known in 
the art that perform substantially the same function in substantially the same way 
                                                          
253 Bilstad, 386 F.3d at 1125. 
254 LizardTech, 424 F.3d at 1345-46. 
255 Application of Edwards, 568 F.2d 1349, 1351 (C.C.P.A. 1978). 
256 See supra, Predictability of the Art, Part I.C.4. 
257 LizardTech, 433 F.3d at 1375 (Lourie, J., concurring). 
258 Enzo Biochem, 323 F.3d at 973 (restricting "the "possession" test for circumstances … in which 
the inventors showed possession of a species of the invention by reference to a deposit, but may not 
have described what else within the scope of the claims they had possession of.") (Lourie, J., 
concurring). 
259 . See Predictability of the Art, Part I.C.4. 
260 LizardTech, 424 F.3d at 1345-46 (Rader, J., dissenting) (citing Capon v. Eshhar, 418 F.3d 1349, 
1358 (Fed. Cir. 2005), see also Enzo Biochem, 323 F.3d at 969. 
261 LizardTech, 424 F.3d at 1345-46. 
262 Enzo Biochem, 323 F.3d at 973 (Lourie, J., concurring). 
263 LizardTech, 433 F.3d at 1375 (Lourie, J., concurring). 
264 Id. at 1345. 
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to obtain substantially the same result as the claimed device or process.265 In 
Capon, the court stated, “[t]he “written description” requirement must be applied 
in the context of the particular invention and the state of the knowledge” in the 
art.266 The LizardTech (2005) court should have looked at both the specification 
and the state of the knowledge in the art. 
The LizardTech (2005) court had held that, “[t]here is no evidence that the 
specification contemplates a more generic way of creating a seamless 
[process].”267 Circuit Judge Lourie (2006) attempted to validate this decision by 
saying that “merely calling an embodiment ‘preferred,’ when there are no others, 
does not entitle one to claims broader than the disclosure.”268 However, neither the 
LizardTech (2005) court nor Circuit Judge Lourie show that the required 
knowledge for making a seamless process without use of “maintaining updated 
sums,” and “periodically compressing said sums” was not within the knowledge of 
a person having skill in the art.”269 The court is not allowing the patentee to act as 
his own lexicographer and draft the application to the scale of complexity in the 
art.270
The requirement the court should have been looking for is whether “the 
specification makes clear that the invention does not include a particular 
feature.”271 As noted above, this is possible only by ascertaining the knowledge of 
the art. The difficulty here, as with Bilstad, is that the court did not make clear that 
the “feature is . . . outside the reach of the claims.”272
g. No New Matter 
Circuit Judge Lourie also attempted to bolster the court’s reliance on the 
possession test by pointing out that patent law bars new information in a filed 
application, so 35 U.S.C. § 112 cannot have such a role.273 The law cited by 
Circuit Judge Lourie states that “[n]o amendment” shall introduce new matter.”274
Here, however, Circuit Judge Lourie’s appears to add further to the confusion over 
the role of the possession test. For example, in Enzo Biochem, Circuit Judge Lourie 
correctly noted that an amendment cannot add knowledge to the specification, so 
the possession test under § 112(1) is proper to assure that all embodiments are fully 
and properly disclosed as of the filing of the application.275 Priority disputes also 
involve the test of disclosure to the filing date, and would be another instance 
                                                          
265 Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608, 70 S.Ct. 854 (1950). 
266 Capon v. Eshhar, 418 F.3d 1349, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
267 LizardTech, 424 F.3d at 1344. 
268 LizardTech, 433 F.3d at 1375 (Lourie, J., concurring). 
269 Id. at 1343. 
270 Id. at 1345 (citing In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995)). 
271 Scimed Life Sys. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., 242 F.3d 1337, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
272 Id.
273 LizardTech, 433 F.3d at 1375. 
274 35 U.S.C. § 132 (2006). 
275 Enzo Biochem, 323 F.3d 956, 973 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (Lourie, J, concurring) ("[T]he proper basis 
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where Circuit Judge Lourie’s reliance on the possession test would be proper.276
However, LizardTech was about claim construction and neither an amendment nor 
a priority date was before the court in this case.277 Consequently, Circuit Judge 
Lourie’s invocation of §132 here is inapposite. 
h. A Non-Action is Not Precedent 
Circuit Judge Lourie also argued that “this court has at least twice declined 
to hear a written description case en banc,” so “there is no reason for our court to 
hear this case en banc.”278 The purpose of the Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit is to “strengthen the United States patent system in such a way as to foster 
technological growth and industrial innovation.”279 Markman made claim 
construction a matter of law for the court, while the Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circcuit has renounced stare decisis for claim construction.280 If the Court 
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit bars stare decisis for the fundamental action of 
claim construction, it is inapposite to use stare decisis as justification for inaction 
on claim construction. 
IV. RISE OF THE EVOLVING WRITTEN DESCRIPTION DOCTRINE
A. Circuit Judge Rader Dissents 
1. Circuit Judge Rader’s View on the JVW Opinion 
At issue with Circuit Judge Rader in JVW, as argued in the LizardTech
dissent, is how the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit handled the disparity 
between the specification and the disputed claim as compared to other holdings.281
In JVW, the court found infringement by the V3, a video game controller, even 
though the patent specification for the infringed invention was a holder for a video 
game controller.282
Circuit Judge Rader was not troubled that the Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit allowed this broad scope of patent coverage.283 In fact, Circuit 
Judge Rader cited several cases (discussed infra) allowing broad interpretation of 
claims.284 What Circuit Judge Rader found troubling with the JVW opinion was 
that the following day another panel of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
issued the LizardTech ruling that invalidated, rather than finding infringement of, a 
                                                          
276 Enzo Biochem, 323 F.3d 956, 969 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
277 LizardTech, 2000 WL 35453681 at 1 (W.D. Wash. 2000). 
278 LizardTech, 433 F.3d at 1375-76 (Lourie, J., concurring). 
279 Markman, 517 U.S. at 390 (citing H.R.Rep. No. 97-312, pp. 20 (1981)). 
280 Markman, 517 U.S. at 372; Medrad, 401 F.3d  at 1319. 
281 LizardTech, 433 F.3d at 1376 (Rader, J., dissenting). 
282 JVW Enters., 424 F.3d at 1335. 
283 LizardTech, 433 F.3d at 1377. 
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34 BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP & THE LAW Vol. I:1 
claim that the LizardTech patentee sought to have read broadly.285
2. Comparing the Opinions 
The force of Circuit Judge Rader’s dissent is immediately apparent.286 “This 
court’s written description jurisprudence has become opaque to the point of 
obscuring other areas of this court’s law.”287 As was apparent to Circuit Judge 
Rader, the JVW court validated a claim for a video game controller holder to 
include within its scope a video game controller, even though the disclosure did 
not demonstrate such scope. Conversely, the LizardTech (2005) court invalidated a 
claim because the disclosure did not demonstrate such broad scope.288
In both cases, the claims encompass more than the specification expressly 
describes.” Yet, “[d]espite their similarities, the outcomes in LizardTech and JVW
are strikingly different.” “In JVW, this court says that a claim scope in excess of the 
specification’s embodiments grants a broader range of infringement,” while “[i]n 
LizardTech, this court says that a claim scope in excess of the specification’s 
embodiments invalidates the claim.289
Quoting a trade article, Circuit Judge Rader remarks that these are “[t]wo 
cases whose juxtaposition presents a puzzle.”290 Circuit Judge Rader found 
particularly exasperating the rationale of the courts in each case: “[I]n JVW, this 
court determines that the claims are properly construed as broader than the 
disclosed embodiments because ‘the patentee did not intend for the claims and the 
embodiments disclosed in the specification to be coextensive.’”291  Meanwhile, 
“[i]n LizardTech, this court invalidates claims that are broader than the disclosed 
embodiments because ‘[t]here is no evidence that the specification contemplates a 
more generic way’ of performing the claimed invention.”292
Circuit Judge Rader correctly noted that this inconsistency is not lost as a 
source of confusion for the patent bar. “[T]hese next-door neighbors in West’s 
Federal Reporter must leave practitioners in a quandary.”293 Acknowledging the 
true difficulty, Circuit Judge Rader said that in the face of these opinions, the Court 
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit “provides little or no guidance about the 
standard it uses to decide” whether a disclosure is adequate under 35 U.S.C. § 
112.294
                                                          
285 LizardTech, 242 F.3d at 1346. 
286 LizardTech, 433 F.3d at 1376-81 (Rader, J., dissenting). 
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288 LizardTech, 424 F.3d at 1347. 
289 LizardTech, 433 F.3d at 1376 (Rader, J., dissenting). 
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B. The Crooked Path to the Evolving Written Description Doctrine 
At this point, the reader might want to step back and look at the claim 
construction routes taken by both cases. The claim construction in JVW was “in 
light of this court’s recent en banc clarification of claim construction [in 
Phillips].”295 LizardTech, on the other hand, was faced with “constru[ing] claim 21 
as limited to seamless discrete wavelet transformation . . . despite the absence of 
the term seamless in that claim,”296 and without “maintaining updated sums,” or 
“periodically compressing said sums” in the process.297
It is also helpful to recognize that in JVW, the accused infringer asked that 
the court read the claim narrowly according to the specification where the patent 
did not express the disputed scope of claim.298 Instead, the court declined and held 
for infringement.299 According to Circuit Judge Rader, this is keeping with the 
Phillips viewpoint. “Phillips clarified claim construction, and in the process 
discussed the situation of specific embodiments coupled with broad claims: 
“[A]lthough the specification often describes very specific embodiments of the 
invention, we have repeatedly warned against confining the claims to those 
embodiments.”300
Circuit Judge Rader also cited other case law supporting a broader reading of 
the claim: 
[C]laims may embrace ‘different subject matter than is illustrated in the specific 
embodiments in the specification.’301 In particular, we have expressly rejected the 
contention that if a patent describes only a single embodiment, the claims of the 
patent must be construed as being limited to that embodiment.302 To avoid 
importing limitations from the specification into the claims, it is important to keep 
in mind that the purposes of the specification are to teach and enable those of skill 
in the art to make and use the invention and to provide a best mode for doing so.303
Indeed, in Phillips itself, this court gave the broad claim term ‘baffle’ a meaning 
beyond the narrower bullet-deflecting embodiments in the specification.304
In LizardTech, on the other hand, the court adopted a disputed claim 
construction at the argument of the patentee.305 Then, the patentee suggested that 
                                                          
295 LizardTech, 433 F.3d at 1377 (Rader, J., dissenting) (citing JVW Enters., 424 F.3d at 1335) 
(citing Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323 (en banc)). 
296 Id. at 1376-77 n.1. 
297 LizardTech, 424 F.3d at 1343. 
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305 LizardTech, 424 F.3d at 1344. 
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the court should read the claim broadly with less regard to the specification.306
Instead, the court held the claim invalid.307 Thus, the outcome seems dependent on 
who does the asking. As bizarre as this observation seems to be, Circuit Judge 
Rader recognized an “unsatisfying solution” of logic to the cases.308 This is the 
“evolving written description doctrine.”309
If the claims are construed as confined to the embodiments in the specification, 
written description invalidity does not come into play. If the claims, on the other 
hand, are construed to embrace more than the specification, this court (on only 
some occasions and without a clear standard to determine those occasions in 
advance) will invalidate.310
As Circuit Judge Rader commented, the LizardTech ruling must leave 
“[p]atent owners and practitioners. . . [struggling] to resolve the tension between 
Phillips and cases like LizardTech.”311 Certainly, the patentee must have been 
shocked at the claim invalidation.312 On the other hand, although the phrase 
“evolving written description doctrine” is rather new, this author is of the opinion 
that the doctrine has been in place for some time. 
C. The Link to Possession 
In many patent litigation cases, we can assume the accused infringer will 
want the patent construed within the specification tightened, or invalidated, while 
the patentee is looking for the broadest scope of claim coverage. Thus, the first 
sentence of Circuit Judge Rader’s evolving written description doctrine applies to 
the accused infringer while the second phrase applies to the patentee.313 At the 
outset then, Circuit Judge Rader’s evolving written description doctrine seems to 
be a statement in which the outcome seems somewhat dependent on who does the 
asking.314
The next question is that if this is truly a doctrine, what precedents define 
how the doctrine works? In discussing the dissent initially, Circuit Judge Rader did 
not mention the possession test by name, but there was no mistaking he was saying 
that neither patent qualified for such exacting treatment: “[B]oth LizardTech and 
JVW confront an issue common to many patent disputes: claims that are broader 
than the disclosed embodiments. (citations omitted.) Neither opinion involves 
biotechnology or chemistry, . . .[nor] discusses the issue of complexity or 
uncertainty in the art, a frequent characteristic of claims invalidated on written 
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311 Id. at 1378. 
312 Id. at 1377 n.1. 
313 LizardTech, 433 F.3d at 1377 n. 1. 
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2007 THE “EVOLVING WRITTEN DESCRIPTION DOCTRINE” 37 
description grounds.”315
As noted above, Circuit Judge Lourie also bypassed an invocation of the 
term “possession.” even though the LizardTech (2005) court expressly invoked the 
term.316 With both Circuit Judge Lourie and Circuit Judge Rader talking around 
“possession,” it sounds like some kind of judicial mysticism—or an elephant in the 
courtroom. 
D. An Evolving Mystical Expression 
In 1991, Vas-Cath described the possession test and enablement as separate 
requirements.317 Sometime thereafter, confusion set in, even in the same case. In 
Enzo Biochem, the court struggled with defining the possession test by saying that 
“[e]nabling one of skill in the art to make and use the invention is a separate 
requirement.”318 One example the court provided was that “[a] description of [the 
invention] . . . in terms of . . . function . . . fails to distinguish [the invention] from 
others having the same activity or function.”319 This seems fairly clear until we see 
that in the same opinion, the court said that “possession . . . is only a criterion for 
satisfying the statutory written description requirement[, it] is not necessarily 
equivalent to providing a written description.”320 Adding further to the confusion 
was the LizardTech (2005) court, which said that the written description “[1] must 
describe the manner and process of making and using the invention so as to enable 
a person of skill in the art to make and use the full scope of the invention without 
undue experimentation [,and, (2)] describe the invention sufficiently to convey to a 
person of skill in the art that the patentee had possession of the claimed invention 
at the time of the application, i.e., that the patentee invented what is claimed.”321
As a two-part description, this discussion clarifies, as in Vas-Cath, that the written 
description is two parts, enablement (under the PHOSITA test), and possession (a 
full description of the invention at the time of filing).322
Instead of continuing this distinction, the LizardTech (2005) court then tied 
enablement and possession together and made them interchangeable.323  “[A] 
recitation of how to make and use the invention across the full breadth of the claim 
is ordinarily sufficient to demonstrate that the inventor possesses the full scope of 
the invention, and vice versa.”324
As Circuit Judge Rader recognized, the LizardTech (2005) court had reverted 
back to the Enzo Biochem confusion by not “providing [a] neutral standard of 
application, [other than saying] . . . the specification must show ‘possession’ of the 
                                                          
315 Id. at 1376. 
316 LizardTech, 424 F.3d at 1345. 
317 Vas-Cath, 935 F.2d at 1563. 
318 Enzo Biochem, 285 F.3d at 972 (Lourie, J., concurring). 
319 Enzo Biochem, 285 F.3d at 968 (Lourie, J., concurring). 
320 Enzo Biochem, 323 F.3d at 973 (Lourie, J., concurring). 
321 LizardTech, 424 F.3d at 1344-45. 
322 Vas-Cath, 935 F.2d at 1563. 
323 LizardTech, 424 F.3d at 1345. 
324 Id. at 1345 (emphasis added). 
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claimed invention.”325 In doing so, the LizardTech court had once again tossed the 
enablement requirement and the possession test together without regard as to 
which they were applying.326 This lack of distinction is problematic in that rather 
than “explaining a neutral standard for applying written description, LizardTech
seems to fall back on enablement, using the latter as a proxy for the former.”327
The opinion of this author is that by focusing on the requirements of 35 
U.S.C. § 112, paragraph 1, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has 
confused the written description requirement with the requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 
112, paragraph 2 for claims that particularly point out and distinctly disclose the 
elements of the invention. Circuit Judge Rader well summarized this confusion.
“LizardTech’s two clear statements of written description law, [the written 
description must establish] that the patentee invented what is claimed, and, an
originally filed claim can provide the requisite written description, are relegated to 
bookends surrounding an enablement-based application of the new written 
description doctrine.”328 As Circuit Judge Rader noted above, the focus in 
LizardTech is on the claim in the specification (claim 21 specifically). Yet, the 
word “claim” does not appear in the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112. In focusing 
on the possession of enablement in the written description, the Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit has overlooked the second paragraph of § 112 which 
requires a “specification [that] particularly point[s] out and distinctly claim[s] the 
subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.” Consequently, the 
difficulty the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has with possession does not 
lie with the enablement requirement of §112(1), but with the definiteness 
requirement of §112(2). As the U.S. Supreme Court said in Evans, the purpose of 
the specification of a patent is “to put the public in possession of what the party 
claims as his own invention.”329 In focusing on enablement, the Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit has misplaced the focus from “[t]he name of the game is the 
claim.”330
E.  Mystical Precedent 
While bringing focus on the possession test, LizardTech (2006) did not 
answer any questions helpful to resolve the written description dichotomy of 
enablement and possession.331 One question might be the origin, but this author 
suspects the court would disagree even about that. Circuit Judge Rader cited Enzo 
Biochem (2002) as point of origin for the “court[‘s] search[] for a proper standard 
                                                          
325 LizardTech, 433 F.3d at 1378 (Rader, J., dissenting). 
326 Id. at 1345. 
327 LizardTech, 433 F.3d at 1380 (Rader, J., dissenting). 
328 Id. at 1380 (citing LizardTech, 424 F.3d at 1345-46. (Fed. Cir. 2005)). 
329 Evans v. Eaton, 20 U.S. 356, 430-433 (1822). 
330 In re Hiniker Co., 150 F.3d 1362, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 1998), (Clevenger, J., quoting Judge Giles 
Sutherland Rich, Extent of Protection and Interpretation of Claims--American Perspectives, 21 Int'l 
Rev. Indus. Prop. & Copyright L. 497, 499 (1990)). 
331 Id. at 1378 (Rader, J., dissenting) (citing LizardTech, 424 F.3d at 1345). 
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for its revised and evolving written description doctrine.”332 In Enzo Biochem, the 
Court of Appeals “scuttled the “bright line” Lilly (1997) test for written description 
invalidity.”333 This author, however, traces the written description muddle to at 
least Vas-Cath (1991) which, in the opinion of this author, “appl[ied the] 
“possession” test . . . in a way not contemplated by the original test.”334
Regardless of the starting point, the difficulty has been “the impossibility of 
finding a standard that measures the sufficiency of the disclosure in a specification 
by comparing two parts of that same specification.”335 This may be understandable 
where, “[t]he descriptive text needed to meet [the evolving written description 
requirement] . . . will vary with differences in the state of the knowledge in the field
and differences in the predictability of the science.”336 However, it is doubtful that 
anyone wants a patent system that requires the patentee to “[b]ring [the] 
specifications to the Federal Circuit and we will tell you if they contain sufficient 
descriptions.”337
LizardTech (2006) at least showed that “it is apparent that a significant 
number of Federal Circuit judges agree that this court’s evolving written 
description doctrine needs clarification.”338 “My vote to deny en banc review, 
however, should not be taken as an endorsement of our existing written description 
jurisprudence.”339 “Perhaps the entire line of [written description] cases stemming 
from Ruschig is wrong, and perhaps we should at some point address that question 
en banc.”340
However, LizardTech also showed “the court is in no hurry to clarify the 
issue.”341 “Future panel opinions may provide the necessary clarity.”342 “I take no 
position on that issue at this juncture.”343 Thus, Circuit Judge Rader is undoubtedly 
correct that “as this court’s case law creation strays farther from the statute, its 
application only gets more strained.”344 While LizardTech is but one more case 
that makes perpetuates the confusion, it likely will not be the last. 
                                                          
332 Id. at 1378-79 (Rader, J., dissenting). 
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336 Id. at 1379 (Rader, J., dissenting) (quoting Capon, 418 F.3d at 1357-59 (emphasis added)). 
337 Id. at 1379 (Rader, J., dissenting).
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V. CONCLUSION
A. From the Judicial Point of View: Show Possession 
Through this mud of judicial doctrine, Circuit Judge Rader provided two 
clear statements for practitioners and the judiciary. For practitioners, Circuit Judge 
Rader gave this gem: “The ostensible standard for an adequate written description 
is that the specification must show possession of the claimed invention.”345 As yet 
(2007) the court has not clarified the position of the possession doctrine to the 
written description. This author agrees with Circuit Judge Rader, who gave the 
judiciary this admonishment: “From my perspective, this court should not 
postpone further en banc reconsideration of its evolving written description 
doctrine.”346
Until the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit does gives an en banc 
definition, or a retreat from possession, the patent bar will suffer from the lack of a 
definition of what the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit considers the 
requirements of possession. 
B. From the Statutory Point of View: Enablement and Definiteness 
While the JVW347 holding might seem inconsistent with LizardTech; the 
cases presented here, and the discussion in this article show that the Federal Circuit 
Court of Appeals is requiring patentees to show one thing.  “An applicant complies 
with the written description requirement by describing the invention, with all its 
claimed limitations.”348
The JVW patentee won against the Interact V3 because, as the comparative 
patent drawing and Interact V3 photograph show, the V3 mirrored the patented 
invention almost identically.349 On the other hand, the JVW patentee lost against 
the Interact V4 because the specification did not provide a discussion of any means 
for lockably receiving the video game controller other than the L-shaped clips. 
Similarly, LizardTech lost claim 21 and its dependent claims because the 
claim omitted a necessary element and specification failed to demonstrate how 
someone could operate the patented method without “maintaining updated 
sums.”350 The cases discussed here show that the Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit requires patentees to delineate every element and every embodiment in 
sufficient detail, so that of the filing date, the specification enables a person having 
skill in the field of art to understand how to make the invention, how to use the 
invention, and the inventor’s best mode. The problem with the possession doctrine 
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is, as Circuit Judge Rader said: “Bring your specifications to the Federal Circuit 
and we will tell you if they contain sufficient descriptions.”351 Both 35 U.S.C. § 
112 and judicial doctrine provide for broad claim construction through means plus 
function, the doctrine of equivalents and genus-species claims.352 The possession 
doctrine restricts the ability of the patentee to use these statutes and doctrines. 
C.  From the Practitioner Point of View 
The author reviewed many cases not cited here. This research leads the 
author to believe that the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has created a 
two-headed monster for itself and the patent bar. One side wants more disclosure 
of enablement and definiteness to explain new technologies for which the courts 
and art are unprepared. The other side wants to keep the balance of technology and 
patent innovation moving forward. 
Rather than clearly state the requirement, the Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit once coined a buzzword named possession and is now reluctant to 
back away from precedent, even though it disclaims stare decisis—the elephant in 
the courtroom. 
With this greater disclosure requirement in mind, this author supports Circuit 
Judge Rader’s admonition that the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has an 
“evolving written description doctrine.”353 While patent prosecution standards 
were due for tightening in the face of criticism over lax issue policies, the role of 
the judiciary is interpretation of statutes. By creating the possession doctrine and 
loosely applying this judicial requirement, the Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit is expanding judicial doctrine beyond the statutory constraints of 35 U.S.C. 
§ 112. 
Regardless of whether in the greater scheme of patent practice and litigation 
the LizardTech court got it right, interpretations such as JVW will become rare if 
not extinct. As Circuit Judge Rader commented, patent practitioners are in a 
“quandary.”354 The possession test is not a detailed requirement, but rather is a 
“requirement of detail” unlike any checklist within case law or the Manual of 
Patent Examining Procedure. 
As a practitioner, this author agrees that the Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit must abide by precedent and fully explain its rationale. The void of 
explanation creates unnecessary effort for practitioners in drafting applications and 
unnecessary expenses. Compounding matters is that a longer application is not 
necessarily more definitive. District courts will struggle with longer applications, 
and increasing reversal rates. 
The judiciary will likely take a decade to resolve this newest doctrine. Patent 
practitioners need answers now for present and future claim construction issues to 
secure the widest permissible patent rights without invalidation or litigation 
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negating the purpose of the patent. While technology, biology and even language 
evolve, interpretation of the written description, concluding with the claims, must 
be sufficiently unchanging such that it does not frustrate the constitutional mandate 
that intellectual property serves which is “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to . . . Inventors the exclusive Right to 
their . . . Discoveries.”355
                                                          
355 U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
